I. Introduction
It is hard to dispute the role that pharmaceuticals play in modern society.
Numerous drugs have been developed that allow ailments to be treated to a degree that
would have been unimaginable several decades ago.1 Among the groundbreaking drugs
to be developed by various pharmaceutical companies are VIAGRA®, PROZAC®, and
PAXIL®. New drugs require a huge investment by pharmaceutical companies;2
however, a successful drug can potentially bring its producer billions of dollars.3 Not
surprisingly, since a successful drug can bring its maker billions of dollars, these same
drugs often provide the backdrop for contentious litigation. Both PROZAC®4 and
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Neal Masia, The Cost of Developing a New Drug, Focus on Intellectual Property Rights, January 2006,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/cost/htm.
Advances in treating cancer, HIV/AIDS, and a broad host of other afflictions have been
nearly continuous in recent decades, thanks to -in many instances- new drug discoveries.
Economists estimate almost half of the increase in life expectancy achieved over the past
15 years in the industrialized world can be attributed to new drugs. In the United States
alone, the economic gains from medical innovations are estimated at $500 billion per
year.

2

Id. Neal Masia puts the cost of developing a drug at a low of $800 million to a high of $2 billion. Masia
also states that of 5,000 to 10,000 new chemical inventions that look promising, only 250 enter preclinical
laboratory and animal testing. Fewer than ten of these will show enough potential to enter Phase I human
testing.
3
Id. Neal Masia states that “at the current level of reimbursement, economists estimate that only about 30
percent of new medicines actually earn enough revenue during their patented product lifecycle to cover the
average upfront cost of development. If a firm incurred the average cost of drug development and only
invented ‘average’ drugs, it would quickly go out of business.”
4
Eli Lilly and Company v. Barr Laboratories, et. al., 251 F.3d. 955, 968-969 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Eli Lilly
attempted to extend its patent on Prozac by patenting a “method of blocking the uptake of serotonin by
brain neurons in animals by administering the compound fluoextine hydrochloride.” (U.S. Patent No.
4,626,549 ,“the ‘549 patent”). Fluoextine hydrochloride is the active ingredient in Prozac. Id. at 958.
The prior art (U.S. Patent No. 4,590,213 ,“the ‘213 patent”) was directed at a method of “treating anxiety in
a human by administering an effective amount of fluoxetine or a pharmaceutically-acceptable salt thereof.”
Id. at 962. Originally, the Federal Circuit invalidated the ‘549 patent on the grounds of double patenting.
Eli Lilly v. Barr Laboratories, 222 F.3d. 973 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The Court subsequently vacated the panel
decision and directed a specific revision of the double patenting section. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 958. In its
final opinion the Court stated that “serotonin uptake is a natural biological activity that occurs when
fluoxetine hydrochloride is administered to an animal… [And] that it is literally impossible to treat
someone with anxiety without at the same time inhibiting serotonin uptake.” Id. at 969-970. Based on this
finding the Court found that Barr Laboratories had provided “ample foundation for the proposition that
administration of fluoxetine hydrochloride naturally and inherently inhibits the uptake of serotonin.” Id. at
970. Because humans are members of the animal genus the ‘549 patent was inherently anticipated by the
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PAXIL®5 resulted in substantial litigation. In addition, the process that a pharmaceutical
company must satisfy to obtain approval from the FDA to market a drug is long and
cumbersome.6 Congress recognized that the regulatory requirements of the FDA
shortened the commercial life of patented drugs and, by decreasing the profits of
pharmaceutical companies, endangered future research and development.7 Based on its

‘213 patent. Id. at 971. Further controversy resulted from the Court’s determination that the ‘213 was prior
art to the ‘549 patent, despite having a later priority date. The patent application for the ‘213 patent had
priority from April 8, 1983 and issued on May 20, 1986. Id. The patent application for the ‘549 patent was
a continuation-in-part originally filed in about April 1986 and issued in December 1986. Id. at 968, FN 7.
However, the ‘549 patent, as a continuation-in-part application, claimed an effective filing date of January
10, 1974. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 973, Newman’s dissent to refusal to reconsider the case en banc. Despite
this fact, the Court determined that the ‘549 patent was obvious in light of the later filed ‘213 patent. Id. at
968-970. The Court was likely moved to its conclusion by the seemingly endless divisional applications,
continuation applications and patents which arose from the original patent and, as the Court stated, “rivals
the Hapsburg legacy.” Id. at 959. Newman’s dissent will be further discussed later in this paper, as she
also notes concern for the effect that this decision could have on future patenting of biological inventions.
Id. at 977, see pg. 5, infra.
5
SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp.2d. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003), aff’d on other grounds,
365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004); opinion vacated en banc, 403 F.3d. 1328 (2005); aff’d on other grounds,
403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The PAXIL® case provides another situation where a drug patent was
ultimately disposed of on the basis that it was anticipated inherently by the prior art. The PAXIL® case the
prior art mutated into a “pseudopolymorph” that was more stable and easily manufactured. SmithKline,
247 F.Supp.2d. 1016-1020. The new composition was distinct from the prior art, but was discovered to
have been created when a patient ingested the prior art. The Federal Circuit originally invalidated the
patent on the basis that clinical trials constituted public use. SmithKline, 365 F.3d. at 1316-1317. Judge
Gajarsa, concurring, states that SmithKline should have limited its patent to “synthetic or non-naturally
occurring” forms of the polymorph, in order prevent infringement by using the prior art. Id. at 1332. The
original panel decision was subsequently vacated by the Court en banc. The PAXIL® patent was then
invalidated after a panel rehearing as inherently anticipated. SmithKline, 403 F.3d. at 1344. See, pp 49-53,
infra.
6
SmithKline, 247 F.Supp.2d. at 1017-1018. Circuit Judge Posner, sitting by designation, states “Because it
takes a long time for a new drugs to be approved by the Food and Drug Administration for sale to the
American public, the actual period during which the producer has an exclusive right to make, use, and sell
the drug is shorter than the statutory term of the patent.”
7
Id.
The compression of the commercially significant patent term by reason of the regulatory
process at the FDA is a matter of great concern to the manufacturers of new drugs. The
cost of developing such a drug is often very great, in part because attempts to develop a
new drug that will be both safe and effective often fail and the cost of these ‘dry holes’
must be reckoned into the cost of the drugs that succeed, as it is only out of the revenues
of those drugs that the costs of the dry holes can be recovered. The greater the upfront
cost of developing a product, the more time that is required to recoup the cost and so
(other things being equal) the longer is the socially optimal patent term. The costs
incurred in running the gauntlet of FDA approval not only increase the manufacturer’s
upfront development cost but compound the delay, also largely due to the FDA, between
obtaining a patent and actually being able to market the patented drug to the consuming
public
(noting that a drug patented in 1977 had still not been approved for marketing to the public in 1985).
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recognition of the unique position that pharmaceuticals play in our society, Congress
attempted to strike a balance- through the Hatch-Waxman Act- that would guarantee the
pharmaceutical companies a reasonable return on their investment8 while allowing
generic drug manufacturers to quickly enter the field upon the expiration of a drug
patent.9
Congress’ willingness to lengthen patent terms of pharmaceuticals in order to
encourage research and development indicates patents may be treated differently when
the public interest demands it. The Federal Circuit’s recent determination that the
doctrine of inherent anticipation should be aggressively applied to the patenting of
metabolites significantly endangers the scientific advancement of pharmaceuticals.10 By
formulating a broad rule on inherent anticipation the Federal Circuit appears to be
directly contravening the policy choice that Congress has made, through the HatchWaxman Act, relating to pharmaceutical research and development. The Federal Circuit
is instead substituting its own policy determination in the place of Congress’.
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Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 268 F.3d. 1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002)(quoting Abbott Labs v.
Young, 920 F.2d. 984, 991 (D.C.Cir.1990)). “[The] provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act ‘emerged from
Congress’ efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name brand pharmaceutical firms
to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously
enabling competitors to bring cheaper generic copies of those drugs to market.’” 35 U.S.C. §156 (relating
to the patent restoration term available under the Hatch-Waxman Act to restore some of the time lost during
the regulatory process).
9
Mylan, 268 F.3d. at 1325-1326.
An ANDA [Abbreviated New Drug Application] offers an expedited approval process for
generic drug manufacturers. Instead of filing a full NDA [New Drug Application] with
new safety and efficacy studies, in an ANDA a generic drug manufacturer may rely in
part on the pioneer manufacturer’s work by submitting data demonstrating the generic
products’ bioequivalence with the previously approved drug.
Portions of Hatch-Waxman relating to generic drugs codified in Title 21 U.S.C. §355.
10
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d. 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This case is central to the
debate of the application of inherent anticipation to pharmaceuticals, and its implications are discussed.
See, pp 11-26, passim.
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Inherent anticipation is not a new concept although, originally, it was an abstract
concept used to address situations where the court appeared sure of the result but unsure
of what reasoning it could use to justify that outcome.11 The evolution of inherent
anticipation was slow, and it was not until 1945 that the Court finally set out a workable
basic rule. In General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp.12 the Court stated that “the
prior art discloses the method of making the article having the characteristics of the
patented product, though all the advantageous properties of the product had not been fully
appreciated.”13 The Court went on to state that:
[The inventor] found latent qualities in an old discovery and adapted it to a useful end.
But that did not advance the frontiers of science in this narrow field so as to satisfy the
exacting standards of our patent system. Where there has been use of an article or where
the method of its manufacture is known, more than a new advantage of the product must
be discovered in order to claim invention.14
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See e.g. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 711(1880) (holding that whether Tilghman’s process of
distilling fat acid had been practiced before by others was immaterial in determining whether he was
entitled to a patent). Paul Galloway, Inherently Difficult Analysis for Inherent and Accidental
Biotechnological Inventions, Suffolk U. L. Rev., 38 SFKULR 73, 77-78 (2004)(stating that the process had
been practiced when tallow was introduced as lubrication for the piston in the machine, the formation of fat
acid in the machine was unintended and not understood. This situation is now seen as “accidental
anticipation” and is distinct from “inherent anticipation” because the result is not necessarily present within
the invention, method, or process). See also, Edison Electric v. Novelty Incandescent Lamp Co., 167 F.
977 (3rd Cir. 1909)(finding that a patent was not barred for a new and preferable light bulb. The bulb had
been previously built, but the construction was accidental and those bulbs were discarded as being
defective, so the true value of the invention was not discovered until Edison recognized and patented it, so
the patent was valid).
12
General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242 (1945). This case concerned the frosting
of light bulbs. Clear light bulbs produced unpleasant glare. One method to address glare was to frost the
outside of the bulb; however, this frosting became easily dirty and was difficult to clean. The natural
alternative was to frost the inside of the bulb, but this substantially weakened the bulb, almost to the point
that it was unfit for use. Pipkin, the inventor in this case, found that a second treatment of frost made the
bulb stronger by eating away the crevices created by the first layer of frost. This treatment had been
discovered many years earlier and was known to give glass a rounded, as opposed to angular and creviced,
finish. What had not been discovered was that a second finish ate away at some of original frosting and
would actually strengthen the bulb. This phenomenon was referred to as “Pipkin’s paradox” and was the
basis of his patent application. Ultimately, the court found his discovery insufficient for a patent.
13
Id. at 248 (quoting Lovell Mfg. Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623).
14
Id. at 248-249.
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The question raised by the GE case above is to what degree it should be applied to
biological inventions.15 Does the stringent test recited above, and largely adopted by the
Federal Circuit in Schering v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals and SmithKline Beecham v.
Apotex, protect the public by ensuring that pharmaceuticals, and their accompanying
metabolites, pass to the public domain as soon as possible; or does the Schering decision
pose a threat to scientific advancement by forcing pharmaceuticals to disclose their
inventions in order to obtain patent protection, but limiting their ability to claim
metabolites caused by their products, even if they could not have recognized the benefits
of their invention prior to the patent’s critical date?
The rule enunciated in Schering is a new interpretation of the previous case law
concerning inherent anticipation. The Federal Circuit’s new view- that inherency no
longer requires recognition of the trait bya “person having ordinary skill in the art”
(PHOSITA) - applies to any situation where one is attempting to gain a patent for a
derivative result of a previous patent. However, the effects of this new rule will felt most
in the pharmaceutical industry. There is a danger that, by not requiring recognition by
PHOSITA to apply the doctrine of inherent anticipation, the ability to patent pre-existing
unrecognized biological inventions could be imperiled, regardless of the individual utility
that may be garnered from these substances once their value is recognized.
Judge Pauline Newman of the Federal Circuit expressed her concern that the
Federal Circuit, in 2001, was adopting bright line rules which, by precluding protection

15

Metabolites form when an “ingested pharmaceutical compound undergoes a chemical conversion in the
digestive tract to form a new metabolite compound.” Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1375. Biological inventions
are similar to metabolites, but the processes that lead to biological compositions are not limited to the
digestive tract. Metabolites are merely a specific form of biological invention.
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for many metabolites, would stifle the advancement of biological inventions. Judge
Newman stated:
[E]very biological property is the natural and inherent result of the chemical structure
from which it arises, whether or not it has been discovered. To negate the patentability of
a discovery of biological activity because it is ‘the natural result’ of the chemical
compound can have powerful consequences for the patentability of biological
inventions.16

The decision in Schering was the culminating case in a lengthy split within the
Federal Circuit. One view, espoused most forcefully by Judge Newman in Continental
Can Company v. Monsanto,17 states that patenting should only be prevented if a “person
having ordinary skill in the art” could have recognized the inherent trait that was now
being claimed.18 Judge Randall Rader explicitly disavowed any such notion in
Schering.19 Judge Newman believes that more lenient and clear standards, with respect
to the patenting of pharmaceutical and biological inventions, are necessary in light of the

16

Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 976.
Continental Can v. Monsanto, 948 F.2d. 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
18
Id. at 1269. Judge Newman wrote:
[T]o serve as anticipation when the reference is silent about the asserted inherent
characteristic, such a gap must be filled with recourse to extrinsic evidence. Such
evidence must make clear that the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the
thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of
ordinary skill.
19
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1377. Judge Rader stated that “recognition by a person of ordinary skill in the art
before the critical date [of the patent] is not required to show anticipation by inherency.” He went on to
further state that:
Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art
reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the
critical date. In Continental Can this court vacated summary judgment of anticipation of
claims reciting a plastic bottle with hollow ribs over a prior art disclosing a plastic bottle.
The record contained conflicting expert testimony about whether the ribs of the prior art
plastic bottle were solid. Given the material fact, this court vacated summary judgment
as improper.
Id. Judge Rader did sit on the panel that ruled on Continental Can, but Judge Newman, the author of the
Continental Can opinion would likely disagree with his view of that case, see FN 18, supra. Subsequently,
Judge Newman lamented the Circuit’s refusal to hear the Schering case en banc and stated “no precedent
supports the position that a product whose existence was not previously known and is not in the prior art is
always unpatentable on the grounds that it existed undiscovered.” She went further and quoted her
language of Continental Can, noted in FN 18, supra, which required recognition of the inherent
characteristic by PHOSITA. Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. 992, 993-995 (Fed. Cir. 2003), dissent to
denial of rehearing en banc.
17

6

unpredictability of the breakthroughs that various discoveries may bring,20 but in
Schering, the Federal Circuit, led by Judge Randall Rader, adopted a clear position which
sets extremely stringent standards for the patenting of metabolites and other biologicals.21
This paper will examine the split that had developed within the Federal Circuit
concerning whether it is necessary that there be recognition by PHOSITA in order to
apply the doctrine of inherent anticipation. It will then argue that Congress, through the
Hatch-Waxman Amendments, has already recognized that pharmaceuticals occupy a
uniquely important position within society; and, based upon that, it is necessary that
pharmaceutical and biological inventions be given different treatment when applying
inherent anticipation to prevent the stifling of scientific advancement which may
otherwise occur. Finally, some suggestions will be made on how pharmaceutical
companies can be protected, to ensure that they maintain sufficient incentives to continue
to engage in the research and development of new drugs, including investigation of the
biological causes of existing compositions; but, at the same time, the suggestions will
attempt to remove as little as necessary from the public domain.
II. Inherent Anticipation
Patents that relate to metabolites must meet all the basic requirements of
patentability.22 Among the most basic requirements are that an invention be useful,23
novel24, and non-obvious.25 Anticipation under §102(a) occurs if the identical invention

20

Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d. at 976.
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1381. Judge Rader allowed for the patenting of metabolites with “proper
claiming.” This, of course, would require that the metabolite be recognized prior to the patent’s critical
date, which is a difficult proposition given that it may be the state of technology which prevents such
recognition. He also stated that the metabolite could be patented in its “pure and isolated form … or as a
pharmaceutical carrier.”
22
35 U.S.C. §§101-103 (2005).
23
35 U.S.C. §101 (2005).
24
35 U.S.C. §102 (2005).
21
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has been claimed on a single prior art reference.26 When more than one prior art
reference is required to find unpatentability, or patentability revolves around a minor
improvement of the prior art, then the validity of the patent is evaluated for obviousness
under §103.27 In some cases, a prior art reference may anticipate if all the claimed
limitations are not disclosed within the prior art but are deemed to be inherent within it.28
As Judge Rader said in Atlas Powder v. Ireco Inc., “under the principles of inherency, if
the prior art necessarily functions in accordance with, or includes, the claimed
limitations, it anticipates.”29 Anticipation is a factual determination30 thatwill prevent
patenting.31 If a patent has already been issued then anticipation must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence, but if this burden is met the patent will be invalidated.32
The doctrine of inherent anticipation is an off-shot of accidental anticipation.
Accidental anticipation was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Tilghman v.
Proctor.33 In that case the Court found that Tilghman’s invention for separating fats and
oils was not anticipated because it had only been practiced accidentally and the results,
and benefits, were not understood.34 This accidental use had occurred when individuals
practicing the prior art introduced tallow to help lubricate the piston on a steam
cylinder.35 The Court stated that the “acids were accidentally and unwittingly produced,

25

35 U.S.C. §103 (2005).
Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1267 (citing Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Banner, 778 F.2d. 775,
780 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 730 F.2d.
1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
27
Id.
28
Verdegaal Bros., Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 814 F.2d. 628, 630 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
29
Atlas Powder v. Ireco Co. of Cal., 190 F.3d. 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
30
Standard Havens v. Gencor Industries, 953 F.2d. 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Ralston Purina Co.
v Far-Mar-Co., 772 F.2d. 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
31
Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d. at 1347 (citing Titanium Metals, 778 F.2d. at 782).
32
Id. 35 U.S.C. §282.
33
Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707. See FN 11, supra.
34
Id. at 711.
35
Id.
26
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whilst the operators were in pursuit of other and different results, without exciting
attention and without its even being known what was done or how it had been done, it
would be absurd to say it was an anticipation of Tilghman’s discovery.”36 The Court’s
determination that the situation in Tilghman did not qualify as anticipation makes sense,
but the explanation seems to center on the previous producer’s failure to appreciate what
had occurred through their actions.37 Future cases added to theTilghman decision; and,
today, Tilghman and cases following its fact pattern are described as being cases of
“accidental anticipation.”38 Tilghman continues to be valid law, although the
circumstances that lead to a finding of accidental anticipation do not appear common.
Courtshave long treated inherent anticipation and accidental anticipation as being
distinct from one another.39 Judge Rader distinguished Tilghman from Schering by

36

Id. at 711-712.
Id.
38
Paul Galloway has outlined the factors that the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, have considered in determining whether “inherent anticipation” or “accidental
anticipation” applies to certain sets of facts. The factors he recites are:
37

1) whether the prior art intended the claimed process; 2) whether the prior art includes
knowledge of the claimed composition or process; 3) whether the prior art includes
knowledge of the newly discovered result of the claimed process or knowledge of the
newly discovered function of the claimed composition; 4) whether the prior art includes
knowledge of the claimed component in the claimed composition; 5) whether the prior art
performs the claimed process or makes or uses the claimed composition for a different
purpose; 6) whether the claimed composition is useful in the prior art; 7) whether the
claimed material is useful to achieve the claimed result in the prior art and; 8) whether the
claimed process performs occasionally or under unusual conditions in the prior art or the
claimed composition is formed occasionally or under unusual conditions.
Galloway, 38 SFKULR at 91. Accidental anticipation is differentiated from inherent anticipation in that
the result, in inherent anticipation, is the naturally occurring and inevitable result of practicing the prior art.
A determination that accidental anticipation exists allows for patenting; whereas a finding of inherent
anticipation precludes patenting.
39
See e.g., The American Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 696 F.2d. 1053 (4th Cir. 1982)(finding that
a patent to eviscerate clams using a “shearing hydraulic force” was valid and had only been accidentally
anticipated by the prior art, whose use of hydraulic force was incidental); But see, Bird Provision Co. v.
Owens Country Sausage, Inc., 568 F.2d. 369 (5th Cir. 1978)(finding that a method to “hot process” pork
sausage to lengthen shelf life was anticipated by prior art, even though the prior art did not recognize the
implications to shelf life). See also, Galloway, 38 SFKULR at 77-80, development of the doctrines of
inherent anticipation and accidental anticipation. The Bird case also presents the opportunity to pose an
interesting inherent anticipation hypothetical unrelated to pharmaceuticals: assume that a chemical was
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noting that the claimed process from Tilghman was not found to be inevitably present in
the prior art.40 He then concluded that since the claimed metabolite was inherently
present whenever loratadine was ingested, the sale of loratadine resulted in the sale of the
patented metabolite; and, regardless of whether there was recognition by PHOSITA,
invalidity due to inherent anticipation was applicable.41
Inherent anticipation requires that an event inevitably follow.42 As the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals stated in In Re Oelrich, “inherency … may not be
established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain thing may result
from a given set of circumstances is not sufficient.”43 The Court went on to state that if it
is shown that the “natural result flowing from the operation as taught [in the prior art to
PHOSITA] would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems to be
well settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.”44 Allowing a patent for

unknowingly produced by the “hot process” but never recognized, and, years later, a new method was
created that substantially lengthened the shelf life of pork by creating that same chemical (apparently an
impressive feat), but this time the chemical was detected. If the company that discovered the new process
patented both the process and the resulting chemical could a competitor invalidate the patent on the
chemical because it was inherently anticipated by the prior art “hot process.” Under Schering and
SmithKline, the answer is almost certainly “yes” since the undetected chemical would be inherent, but
undetected, within the prior art. This could make many companies balk when considering whether to
obtain a patent or retain a method as a trade secret.
40
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378.
41
Id. Judge Rader appears somewhat uncertain if the basis of the Schering decision will be accepted, as
demonstrated by his attempts in the opinion to distinguish Tilghman and find no need for recognition by
PHOSITA. For example, he states: “Applying an inherency principle in the context of an on sale bar under
35 U.S.C. §102(b), this court has distinguished Eibel and Tilghman,” Id. Several sentences later, after
summarizing several additional cases, Judge Rader says:
In those cases the product sold or offered for sale had an inherent, but unrecognized
feature that was a limitation of the asserted claims. Thus, this court has distinguished
Eibel and Tilghman, which therefore do not bind this court to find no anticipation
because skilled artisans did not recognize that the prior art ‘233 patent inherently
produced the claimed invention.
Id.
In Re Oelrich, 666 F.2d 578 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
43
Id. at 581 (emphasis added), (citing Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d. 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939).
44
Id. (emphasis added).
42
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a claim that is inherent within the prior art has the practical effect of removing that claim
from the public domain, at least for the duration of a new patent.45
The Supreme Court touched more clearly on inherent anticipation in the case of
General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co.46 In that case the court made clear that
more than the mere discovery of a “new advantage” to an existing product is required in
order to obtain a patent.47 In that case the inventor, Pipkin, discovered that a second
treatment of frost, inside the bulb, actually strengthens the bulb by dissolving away
additional glass which would otherwise weaken the bulb.48 The Court did not believe
that Pipkin’s advancement warranted patent protection.49 However, the Court did leave
open the possibility that the discovery of a new quality, which does advance the science
in a narrow field, could be entitled to a patent.50 But, absent such advancement, the
public is merely being deprived of a good for an additional patent term.51
Public policy considerations best explain why the Federal Circuit adopted such a
hardline in Schering and SmithKline. The Federal Circuit’s concern is that permitting the
consecutive patenting of pharmaceuticals, and later of their in vivo biological by-

45

Application of Roy Wiseman, Jr., 596. F.2d. 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
General Electric, 326 U.S. 242, see FN 12 supra, for facts.
47
Id. at 248-249.
48
Id. at 244-245.
49
Id. at 248-249.
50
Id.
51
The test espoused by Judge Newman in Continental Can and derived from previous cases was meant to
address the concerns of undeserved patent extensions. The requirements for inherency to be triggered were
that 1) the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing described in the reference and 2) it
would be so recognized by persons having ordinary skill in the art. Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1268.
The first portion of the test attempts to distinguish accidental anticipation from inherent anticipation. As a
threshold matter, accidental anticipation may not bar a patent since the public has not derived benefit from
the discovery. Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 711; see also, Eibel, 261 U.S. at 66. The second portion of the test
addresses the fact that it a thing is inherently present in a prior art reference but not recognized then it is
most likely not obvious and its discovery could provide the “[advancement of] the frontiers of science in [a]
narrow field” that the Supreme Court alluded to in General Electric, 326 U.S. at 248-249. The second
portion of the test also prevents claims that, while appearing to advance science in a narrow field, are
known to technologists in the field but not to Judges, Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269.
46
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products, would have the practical result of substantially lengthening the patent
protection of the pharmaceutical, as well as preventing the creation of other
pharmaceuticals that may metabolize into the same biological composition, without
substantially advancing the present frontiers of science.
A. Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals
The Schering case concerned two patents.52 The first was (U.S. Patent No.
4,282,233, “the ‘233 patent”).53 The ‘233 patent covered loratadine, the active ingredient
in an antihistamine marketed by Schering under the brand name CLARITIN®.54
CLARITIN® was unique in the marketplace at the time it was launched because it was an
antihistamine that did not cause drowsiness.55 The ‘233 patent issued in 1981 and had
expired by the time the Federal Circuit considered the case.56 The second patent at issue
in the case was (U.S. Patent No. 4,659,716 ,“the ‘716 patent”).57 The ‘716 patent covered
a metabolite of loratadine called descarboethoxyloratadine (DCL), which is also a nondrowsy antihistamine.58 Metabolites form when an “ingested pharmaceutical undergoes a
chemical conversion [during the course of] the digestive process to form a new
metabolite compound.”59 The ‘716 patent issued in April 1987 and was set to expire in
April 2004.60 Numerous generic drug manufacturers sought to market generic versions
of loratadine once the ‘233 patent had expired, but were required to assert that the ‘716
patent was invalid or not infringed by their practice of the ‘233 patent because of

52

Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 339 F.3d. 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1374.
54
Id. at 1375.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1374.
58
Id. at 1375.
59
Id.
60
Id.
53

12

Schering’s listing of the ‘716 patent in the “Orange Book” in connection with the ‘233
patent.61
Since the earliest priority date of the ‘716 patent was February 15, 1984, the ‘233
patent was prior art over the ‘716 patent.62 After cross-motions for summary judgment
the District Court invalidated the ‘716 patent as being anticipated under 35 U.S.C.
§102(b) because DCL was “necessarily formed as a metabolite by carrying out the
process disclosed in the ‘233 patent.”63 Schering appealed the District Court’s decision.
Judge Rader authored the opinion in Schering and took full advantage of the
opportunity to lay out the exacting standards to applywhen evaluating a patent under the
doctrine of inherent anticipation. He started by making clear that prior art “may

61

Id. at 1376; SmithKline v. Apotex, et.al., Federal Trade Commission Amicus Curie Concerning
Torpharm’s Cross Motion for Entry as an Amended Order, 2003 WL 22023358 (E.D. Pa.). Once an NDA
is approved the patents related to it are submitted with the NDA and listed. Later, any new patent
information relating to the approved drug is submitted to the FDA and listed in the “Orange Book.” To be
listed, the patent must contain at least one valid product or use claim. However, once the patents are listed,
any filing of an ANDA approval for a drug that involves a listed patent will automatically trigger a 30
month stay. During this time the FDA may not approve a drug unless the litigation is concluded sooner in
favor of the ANDA applicant. The Orange Book registration has proven problematic because the FDA has
stated that it lacks the expertise and resources to scrutinize the listed patents; and must therefore treat its
role in Orange Book listings as purely ministerial, so there should be no presumption that a patent was
correctly listed. Drug Manufacturers have proven adept at manipulating the Orange Book system to their
advantage. Among the methods that Drug Manufacturers have used to prevent the entry of generic drugs
into the marketplace is the listing of later issued patents in the Orange Book after a suit has been
commenced. This results in either consecutive or overlapping stays that prevent the FDA from considering
the ANDA. The FTC singled out SmithKline’s orange book listings in relation to PAXIL® as being
particularly egregious. Apotex filed an ANDA in March of 1998. At the time SmithKline had only one
patent listed in the Orange Book for PAXIL®. After Apotex commenced its suit an additional eight patents
were filed in the Orange Book at staggered intervals. Based on these additional filings SmithKline was
able to extend its original 30 month stay to a 65 month stay, which was finally set to expire in September of
2003, assuming SmithKline listed no additional patents in the Orange Book.) The Paxil Patent was finally
disposed of by the Federal Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d. 1306; opinion
vacated en banc, 403 F.3d. 1328; aff’d on other grounds; 403 F.3d. 1331. The problem of Orange Book
listings is further complicated by the Federal Circuit’s rulings in Andrx Pharmaceticals v. Biovail Corp.,
276 F.3d. 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001); and Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 268 F.3d. 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2002). In these cases the Federal Circuit determined that district courts lacked the power to shorten the 30
month stay and that individuals lacked the ability to commence a private action to require pharmaceuticals
to take steps to de-list patents from the Orange Book, even after those patents had been found to be invalid.
Andrx, 276 F.3d. at 1376; Mylan, 268 F.3d. at 1324, 1330-1333.
62
Schering, 339 F.3d at 1376.
63
Id. Schering Corporation v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals , 2002 WL 20001552 (D. N.J. 2002).
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anticipate without disclosing every feature of the claimed invention if that missing
characteristic is necessarily present, or inherent, in the single anticipating reference.”64
Rader then stated “[a]t the outset, this Court rejects the contention that inherent
anticipation requires recognition in the prior art.”65 This is a striking determination
because numerous cases, including Continental Can, appear to stand for the proposition
that an anticipating reference must be recognized by PHOSITA to be inherently
anticipated.66 In rejecting this view, Judge Rader attempts to distinguish Continental Can
as a summary judgment determination where disputed material facts made any inherent
anticipation analysis premature.67 However, Judge Rader’s attempt to minimize the reach
of Continental Can is unconvincing, based on the clear view expressed by Judge
Newman in that case.
Judge Newman, the author of the Continental Can opinion, stated that for inherent
anticipation to apply “the missing descriptive matter is necessarily present in the thing
described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by persons of ordinary
skill” (emphasis added).68 She found this flexible rule to be necessary to prevent
continuing patents for matters that were outside the knowledge of judges, but not
necessarily the knowledge of those skilled in the art.69 Summary judgment in the

64

Id. at 1377.
Id.
66
Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269.
67
Id.
68
Continental Can, 948 F.2d at 1269. See also, FN 18 and 19, supra.
69
Id. Judge Newman’s primary concern appeared to be that technologists in the field would omit basic
facts as unnecessary to a reference. It could then be possible for an opportunist to attempt to take
advantage of this omission in order to claim something that was already known at the time of patenting, but
not expressly included in the reference. Newman’s later decisions, such as those in Elan Pharmaceuticals
v. Mayo Foundation and her dissent to the Circuit’s refusal to hear Schering en banc, make clear that it was
never her intent to preclude all material present from being foreclosed by inherent anticipation. A cursory
reading of Continental Can, where she says “If, however, the disclosure is sufficient to show that the
natural result flowing from the operation as taught would result in the performance of the questioned
65
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Continental Can case was ultimately reversed because the Federal Circuit found that
there were questions as to whether the process necessarily produced the hollow ribs
claimed.70 However, according to Judge Newman’s framing of the issue, had there been
no question that the process in Continental Can inevitably and always produced hollow
ribs, the Court would still have had to determine whether PHOSITA would have
recognized the hollow ribs in order to uphold a summary judgment of anticipation by
inherency.71 Thus, Judge Rader’s view of the limited importance of Continental Can
does not seem to be supported by Judge Newman’s statement of its holding and rationale.
It is also possible that Judge Rader may have violated the Federal Circuit’s local rules by
overruling a binding precedent in a panel decision.72

function, it seems well settled the disclosure should be sufficient,” could leave an incorrect impression if
taken out of its context.
70
Id.
71
Since the Court did not reach the issue of whether PHOSITA would have recognized the presence of the
trait in the reference, the test in Continental Can is technically dicta, however it is supported by a host of
cases both preceding it, and preceding Schering, MEHL/Biophile, Atlas Powder, and EMI Group, that treat
Continental Can as binding. See e.g., Rosco Corp. v.Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d. 1373, 1380-1381 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)(finding that PHOSITA would not read the reference as inherently creating a mirror of varying
radius); Finnegan Corporation v. ITC, 180 F.3d. 1354, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that one skilled in
the art would not necessarily recognize the “nonresonance ejection” disclosed in the prior art and therefore
the patent is not anticipated); In Re Robertson, 169 F.3d. 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that the Board
in rejecting a patent failed to show that the disclosed diaper fasteners were either necessary or would have
been recognized by an artisan of ordinary skill); In Re Paulsen, 30 F.3d. 1475, 1480-1481 (Fed. Cir.
1994)(holding that a prior art reference must be considered together with the knowledge of one skilled in
the art and, after doing so, the claim is anticipated); In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(Judge
Newman stating the claim is anticipated because the prior art “put one of ordinary skill in possession” of
the claims.); In Re Oelrich, 666 F.2d. 578, 581-582 (Fed. Cir. 1981)(holding that if the disclosure is
sufficient to show that the claim is the natural result flowing from the operation taught [to PHOSITA] then
the disclosure is sufficient); In Re Shetty, 566 F.2d. 81, 84-85 (C.C.P.A. 1977)(finding that PHOSITA
would not have recognized that prior art method to combat microbial infections also inhibited appetite and
the patent is not anticipated); In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1964)(finding that creation of
element 95 would require more skill than possessed by PHOISTA and is therefore not anticipated); see
also Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 26 CCPA 937 (C.C.P.A. 1939); Cf. Telmac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecom, 247
F.3d. 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(holding that an algorithm for “real time call debiting” was anticipated but
citing to Continental Can, Atlas Powder, and MEHL/Biophile despite their different requirements relating
to PHOSITA recognition).
72
Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).
Arguing to a panel to overrule a precedent. Although only the court en banc may
overrule a binding precedent, a party may argue, in its brief and oral argument, to
overrule a binding precedent without petitioning for hearing en banc. The panel will
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Judge Rader continued, in his Schering opinion, to describe how he
believed that the issue presented was one of first impression.73 In Schering the court was
asked to find anticipation based not on the absence of a single limitation, but rather upon
the absence of an entire structure from the prior art.74 The enormity of the item that
would have to be found to be anticipated inherently did not trouble Judge Rader. Rather,
he dispensed with any concerns about finding a whole structure inherently anticipated by
explaining that:
inherency places subject matter in the public domain as well as an express disclosure, the
inherent disclosure of the entire claimed subject matter anticipates as well as inherent
disclosure of a single feature of the claimed subject matter. The extent of the inherent
disclosure does not limit its anticipatory effect.75

He went on to state that a “‘natural result flowing from’ the explicit disclosure of the
prior art” is normally sufficient to find inherency.76

decide whether to ask the regular active judges to consider hearing the case en banc.
(emphasis added).
At this point in time there was already conflicting case law as to whether recognition by PHOSITA was
required. Continental Can and its precursors developed the rule that required recognition by PHOSITA.
On the other side of the argument were Atlas Powder v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d. 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
MEHL/Biophile International, 192 F.3d. 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); EMI Group, 268 F.3d. 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2001). These cases do not require recognition by PHOSITA. However the requirement for recognition by
PHOSITA, while minimized and distinguished by the second line of cases, was not expressly disavowed
until Schering. Incidentally, the three cases that supported the concept that inherent anticipation did not
require recognition by PHOSITA were all authored by Judge Rader in panel decisions, and the oldest case
pre-dated Schering by only four years. Further complicating matters was the fact that Judge Newman
expressly rejected the view that there was no need for recognition by PHOSITA to apply inherent
anticipation in Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 304 F.3d. 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2002), opinion
vacated en banc and remanded, 314 F.3d. 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 346 F.3d. 1051
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Rather than resolving en banc the issue of whether recognition by PHOSITA is required,
the Court merely vacated Judge Newman’s decision and remanded it back to her panel. While this appears
to be a rejection of Judge Newman’s view, it is not the equivalent of the en banc hearing required by
Federal Circuit Rule 35(a)(2).
73
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378. Shepard’s views Continental Can as being of questionable validity.
74
Id. at 1379.
75
Id.
76
Id. (citing Eli Lilly v. Barr Labs, 251 F.3d. 955, 977). The Eli Lilly case is of questionable value here. In
that case Eli Lilly tried to extend its patent on the active ingredient in Prozac by claiming a method of
blocking serotonin uptake in animals. Previously, Eli Lilly claimed a way to treat anxiety in humans which
would naturally block serotonin uptake. The Court originally invalidated the newer patent on the basis of
double patenting. A revised opinion found inherent anticipation since humans are part of the animal genus
and claiming a patentably non distinct treatment for a genus member, when the same treatment has been
claimed for a species member, renders that claim inherently anticipated. It is clear in that case that Eli Lilly
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In an attempt to distinguish the Schering case from other precedent, Judge Rader
found that, based on the record, DCL would have been detectable after ingestion of
loratadine by humans.77 As a result the ‘233 patent was found to have enabled the
production of loratadine.78 Judge Rader stated that to be enabling the ‘233 patent need
“only describe how to make DCL in any form encompassed by a compound claim
covering DCL, e.g., DCL as a metabolite in a patient’s body.”79 In this case, the direction
in the ‘233 patent to administer loratadine to a patient was sufficient to enable a
PHOSITA to create DCL.80 For that reason, the ‘716 patent claims on DCL were
inherently anticipated by the ‘233 patent for loratadine.81
Judge Rader did allow for limited patenting of metabolites.82 The types of patents
that he stated were still possible despite the Schering holding were patents for the pure
and isolated form of a metabolite, in pharmaceutical compositions with pharmaceutically
acceptable carriers, or for a method of administering the metabolite or pharmaceutical

probably recognized that the claims were duplicative, but there was a question as to the order of the priority
of the patents. See FN 4, supra. However, the Eli Lilly case is a good example of the type of behavior that
Judge Rader seemed most concerned with when he issued his ruling in Schering.
77
Id. Contra, In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996 (1964). Claims involving an isotope of americium were
permitted, despite the fact that they would have been present in the Fermi reactor many years prior.
However, they would not have been detectable and its presence was merely theoretical. Judge Rader’s
view is confusing since it does appear to place some importance on recognition, but does not place
importance on whether recognition occurred when the original patent issued, or whether the recognition
was actually the impetus for the new patent. Schering’s counsel also took issue with Judge Rader’s view
that DCL would have been detectable upon ingestion of loratadine. In his combined petition for panel
rehearing and rehearing en banc Schering’s states that Schering had to “develop new, more sensitive testing
methods to detect DCL and other metabolites of the ‘233 patent compounds.” Comined Petition for Panel
Rehearing and Rehearing en banc by Plaintiff-Appellant, 2003 WL 24033460 at 5-6.
78
Schering. 339 F.3d. at 1380-1381.
79
Id. at 1381.
80
Id. at 1381.
81
Id. at 1380. Rader also cites to the patent principle that “that which would literally infringe if later in
time, anticipates if earlier.”
82
Id. at 1381. Judge Rader’s statement regarding continuing patentability of metabolites was dicta in this
case. Judge Rader did not believe that Schering was entitled to any additional patents since Schering
attempted to claim “bare chemical compound.”
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composition.83 However, the decision made clear that metabolites may not have
protection for broad compound claims because such claims are anticipated by the
pharmaceutical composition which causes them.84 Essentially, what Judge Rader
attempted to accomplish with his decision in Schering was to settle the lingering dispute
within the Federal Circuit of whether inherent anticipation could apply to a situation
where there was no recognition by PHOSITA.85
Other members of the court recognized the implications of Judge Rader’s decision
and objected to the potential effects that it would have on both the patenting of
metabolites, and the status of the Federal Circuit’s case law for inherent anticipation.
Perhaps not surprisingly, Judge Newman was the most vociferous in her opposition to

83

Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1381.
Id.
85
The confusion within the Circuit appears to be largely due to three previous panel decisions authored by
Judge Rader. In Atlas Powder, 190 F.3d. 1342; MEHL/Biophile, 192. F.3d. 1362; and EMI Group North
America, 268 F.3d. 1342. The decisions in Atlas and MEHL/Biophile were issued three weeks apart from
one another in late 1999. Judge Rader attempted limit the circumstances where recognition by PHOSITA
would be required by stating in EMI Group that such recognition
84

may be sensible for claims that recite limitations of structure, compositions of matter, and
method steps which could be inherently found in prior art. Such recognition by one of
ordinary skill in the art may be important for establishing that the descriptive matter
would inherently exist in every combination of the claims limitation … [t]heoretical
mechanisms or rules of natural law that are recited in a claim, that are not themselves
patentable, however, do not need to be recognized by one having ordinary skill in the art
for a finding of inherency. A person of ordinary skill does not have to recognize that a
method or structure behaves according to fully and effectively practice the method or
structure.
EMI, 268 F.3d. at 1350-1351. This portion of the EMI Group decision was, until Schering, Judge Rader’s
most bold attempt to alter the rule of inherent anticipation. It’s unclear where his distinction between
structure, composition of matter, and method steps as compared to “natural law” comes from. It is true that
natural law cannot be patented, although the Supreme Court is currently considering what limitations may
exist when a party actually discovers a natural law that leads to an accompanying correlation (Laboratory
Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, No. 04-607, oral arguments heard March 21,
2006, see FN 267, infra). However, Judge Rader held in both Schering and SmithKline v. Apotex, 403
F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005) that when natural processes lead to otherwise patentable material, that material
may not be patented if it existed in the prior art, even if such existence was undiscovered and unrelated to
the utility of the drug.
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both the Schering decision and the decision not to hear it en banc.86 Judge Newman did
not accept Judge Rader’s view on the law of inherent anticipation or approve of how the
new precedent was created.87
I write to state my concern for the panel’s departure from the established law of
anticipation. The court holds “anticipated” a novel chemical compound (DCL), a
compound not known to the prior art and that did not previously exist. The Schering
inventor discovered it in vivo as a degradation product of loratadine, isolated it,
determined its structure, and found its biologic properties. The panel nonetheless holds
that this new compound is unpatentable on the ground of “inherent anticipation”…The
law is that a product is “anticipated” if it is not new. Conversely, it is not anticipated if it
is new. A new product may of course be unpatentable based on obviousness, but it is not
subject to unpatentability for lack of novelty. No precedent supports the position that a
product whose existence was not previously known and is not in the prior art is always
unpatentable on the ground that it existed undiscovered. If the law is to be changed in
this direction it must be done en banc.88

Judge Newman cautioned that the panel’s decision may have a dire impact on the
discovery of biological patents.89 Her primary concern about the substantive affects of
the Schering decision is that there is no longer incentive for pharmaceuticals to invest in
the research and development of metabolites that cannot be patented.90 She also viewed
86

Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. 992, dissent to decision not to rehear en banc. Federal Circuit Rule
35(a)(2) states that “only the court en banc may overrule a binding precedent.” A party may argue before a
panel to overrule a binding precedent, but, before overruling a binding precedent, the panel must decide
whether to take a poll of the active Judges. If a majority of the active Judges choose to hear the matter en
banc, then the decision may be reviewed en banc as dictated in Federal Circuit Rule 35(a)(1). Judge
Newman recognized that the Schering decision, when taken together with Atlas Powder, Mehl/Biophile,
and EMI Group, had the practical result of overruling Continental Can without first holding an en banc
hearing.
87
Id. at 993.
88
Id. See Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).
89
Id. at 994.
90
Id. The Washington Legal Foundation filed an amicus curiae brief in support of SmithKline petition for
a writ of certiorari. In their brief they state their concern that the rule of Schering will not protect material
in the public domain, as Rader wants, but rather stifle innovation. The foundation states that the best way
to increase the flow of useful information is to provide patents that protect the discovery of previously
existing, but unappreciated, compositions. Washington Legal Foundation’s Amicus Curiae Brief in
Support of Petitioners, 2005 WL 3114487 at 8. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America also filed an amicus curiae in support of SmithKline’s petition for certiorari. They too stated a
concern that the SmithKline rule would negate any potential incentive to investigate the beneficial uses of
existing materials. They also gave an example of the new rule’s shortcomings. They state that a broad
spectrum antibiotic tetracycline was developed by studying Auremycin, a pre-existing antibiotic. The
Federal Circuit allowed for the patenting of this newly discovered substance in Glaxo v. NovoPharm, 52
F.3d. 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America Amicus Curiae Brief
in Support of Petitioner, 2005 WL 3087521 at 2-3. It may no longer by practical to research such
compositions because generic manufacturers will be able to file Abbreviated New Drug Applications
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the decision as being based on a misunderstanding of the existing precedent on
inherency.91 In Newman’s view the precedent on inherency had always dealt in two
areas: first, situations where a single piece of prior art teaches all the elements of a claim,
and in these cases the claim lacks novelty.92 The second situation is where a single piece
of prior art does not include all elements of an invention.93 At that point, the question is
whether the omitted elements would have been known to PHOSITA.94 If the missing
elements would have been known to the PHOSITA, as demonstrated by reference to
extrinsic evidence, then the claim is anticipated.95
Clearly, the first circumstance did not exist since DCL was an in vivo
metabolization not covered by the elements of the loratadine ‘233 patent. The second
situation may have applied since loratadine did not claim DCL, but did lead to the
creation of DCL. The question at that point, according to Judge Newman, was whether
PHOSITA would have recognized the presence of DCL. If so, no further patent
protection is warranted due to the danger that sophisticated patent applicants would omit
known claims in order to prolong patent protection. But, rather than engaging in the

(ANDAs) that will capitalize off both the research and testing undertaken by brand name manufacturers.
They will then be able to enter the market with generic forms of the drugs, long before brand name
pharmaceutical manufacturers have been able to recoup their investment. Also lost will be any profits that
can be reinvested in research and development. Pharmaceutical companies could resort to trade secret to
protect metabolites, but there is a danger that one company will be left to discover all alternative ways to
create a metabolite. Allowing patents will place the information in the public domain and, because to the
expanded experimental use exception under Hatch-Waxman, will allow multiple companies to research
alternative methods of creating a metabolite that can be marketed soon after the patent expires. Under
Integra Lifesciences v. Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. 193 (2005), companies may make fair use of patented
products if the use is related to government approval, even if that use is ultimately economic in nature.
This allows for approval of alternative methods of creating a metabolite during the patent term, with
marketing to follow as soon as the term expires. Multiple methods of creating a metabolite are useful to
address the different needs possessed by individuals in society.
91
Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d at 994.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 995.
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analysis of Contiental Can, the Federal Circuit adopted a bright line pre cluding all
additional patents for metabolites regardless of whether PHOSITA recognition was
present.
Judge Newman’s second major objection is that Judge Rader’s panel, in
contradicting what she viewed to be the existing case law concerning inherent
anticipation, went beyond what a panel could permissibly do.96 Judge Newman agreed
that there was no infringement, but she reached that conclusion because she did not
believe that Schering could prevent people from practicing the prior art.97 In her view,
the decision in Schering was not only a misunderstanding of previous case law, but
ultimately amounted to a full scale rejection of existing precedent.98 Newman stated,
understandably, that “a rejection of precedent requires en banc action, not panel
disruption.”99

96

Schering, 348 F.3d. at 995. Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2).
Id. at 993-994.
98
Id. at 995.
99
Id. at 995. Fed. Cir. R. 35(a)(2). It is uncertain exactly why the Federal Circuit chose to address the
matter of inherent anticipation with a panel decision. That the Schering case appears to have been “de
facto” adopted by the circuit, after a panel hearing, seems to speak to the influence of Judge Rader. The
Federal Circuit in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 403 F.3d. 1328, once again seemed to
endorse Judge Rader’s view of inherent anticipation. Initially Judge Rader ruled that clinical trials
constituted public use that would invalidate the “Paxil” patent, but stated that an alternative grounds for
invalidating the patent was inherent anticipation due to SmithKline’s claim that the ‘723 matierial was
created upon ingestion of the prior art ‘196 patent. See SmithKline v. Apotex, 365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2004), vacated by SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal Circuit’s vacating of
the previous “Paxil” decision en banc can be seen as an endorsement of Judge Rader’s view of inherent
anticipation since he specifically stated in his previous decision which alternative grounds he would use to
pass upon the case of given the opportunity, see SmithKline, 365 F.3d at 1320. This allowed Judge Rader
to invalidate the “Paxil” patent based on his view of inherent anticipation and, since the ‘723 substance was
created by ingesting the prior art ‘196 substance, it was inherently anticipated regardless of whether it was
recognized. SmithKline v. Apotex, 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Both the vacating of the previous
“Paxil” decision and the new “Paxil” decision were released on April 8, 2005. However, the cases
preceding Scherng indicate that the matter of inherent anticipation in relation to biological and
pharmaceutical compositions may have actually been festering for a while. A year before Schering, Judge
Newman reversed a District Court decision in Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation, 304 F.3d. 1221
(Fed. Cir. 2002) in which the lower court found a patent for a “recipe” to make transgenic mice was
anticipated. Newman found the prior art possessed too many alternatives to allow for reliable production of
the mice and thus the requirements of anticipation were not met since PHOSITA would not have
recognized how to make the mice. Judge Dyk, in a dissent, objected to what he viewed as the patenting of
97
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Judge Lourie also dissented from the decision not to rehear the case en banc.100
His concern was that Schering was an “extraordinary decision, effectively precluding
virtually all patents on human metabolites of drugs.”101 Judge Lourie also pointed out
some of the practical limitations that currently exist and that affect the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to originally patent metabolites.102 Namely, patents covering
pharmaceuticals typically issue prior to the completion of clinical trials, which is when
the identity and nature of the metabolites are likely to become known.103 He believed
that the Schering decision would preclude protection of related metabolites by creating a
rule that will find existing patents to be effective prior art against their metabolites per
se.104 In Judge Lourie’s view, the mere disclosure of a certain chemical composition that
should be administered to a patient is not sufficient to enable a metabolite merely because
such administration would “inevitably cause the human body to make the metabolite.”105
Judge Lourie would not allow every metabolite to be patented. He stated that he would

“existing inventions” in light of recent cases (In Re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation) that prohibited such
patents. The Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, which later merely vacated the previous panel decision,
Elan, 314 F.3d. 1299. Judge Newman’s later opinion, rather than concentrating on non recognition of the
missing elements by PHOSITA, instead stated that the prior art was not sufficiently enabled to allow one to
replicate without undue experimentation, Elan, 346 F.3d. 1051. Nonetheless, even without the Judge
Newman’s original Elan decision, which directly contradicted Judge Rader’s view on the need for
recognition by PHOSITA to trigger inherent anticipation, there still exists a troubling split within the
Circuit concerning inherent anticipation. The Continental Can line of cases are still good law, as are the
cases relied on by Schering and SmithKline (Atlas Powder, Mehl/Biophile, EMI Group). The two
conflicting lines of cases necessitate resolution by the Court en banc, even though it appears clear that
Judge Rader’s view on inherent anticipation is generally accepted within the Court.
100
Schering, 348 F.3d. at 995.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. Judge Lourie seems to take a strikingly different view on the patenting of metabolites from the view
expressed by Judge Rader. Whereas Judge Rader seems to be primarily concerned with the direct and
immediate public policy concerns surrounding metabolites, namely that pharmaceutical companies will
manage to extend their patent, Judge Lourie appears to be more concerned with how fair the adopted
process would be to those seeking patents. Like Judge Newman, he appears to believe that metabolites do
meet the requirements of patent and seems to feel that a categorical refusal to patent metabolites does
nothing to advance the public interests and will hinder scientific advancement.
104
Schering, 348 F.3d. at 996.
105
Id.
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rule differently if the patent actually taught how to make metabolites or if the patented
material was in “actual public use” prior to the filing of the new patent application. In
those cases the metabolite would be unpatentable.106 According to Judge Lourie, the
Federal Circuit should be interested solely in patent law, not policy or equity.107 To hold
that a “patent on a product, with minimal disclosure of administering to a human or other
subject, anticipates a later application on a metabolite, of which no mention appears
whatsoever in the patent, cannot be correct.”108
Judge Rader’s decisions in Schering, and later in SmithKline, can be justified
through his concern for the public policy implications that would have arisen had the
Circuit allowed for the patenting of metabolites caused by prior art. Despite
acknowledging that, unlike Atlas Powder, MEHL, and EMI Group, the Court was finding
subject matter to be anticipated without any express description present, Judge Rader
found no reason to conclude that a distinct substance arising from prior art should be
treated any differently than an inherent characteristic of prior art.109 In Judge Rader’s
view the dispositive issue is whether an anticipatory reference enabled the use of the

106

Id. Judge Lourie appears willing to apply an on-sale bar to products that produce an unknown
metabolite, but does not believe that the standard one year time period from the initial issuing of the patent
should be applied in determining whether or not a substance is barred from receiving a further patent. In
his view pharmaceutical companies should be allowed to patent any substances discovered during clinical
trials or other experimental stages that occur prior to the drugs being marketed to the public. This view is
more consistent with the view of Continental Can that a reference does not qualify as prior art unless it is
recognized. Judge Newman offered a sensible recommendation that would seem to address the concerns of
both Judge Rader and Judge Lourie. In her view, Schering erred not by patenting a newly discovered
metabolite (DCL) but by attempting to prevent others from practicing prior art in the public domain that
could result in the production of the patented metabolite. Schering v. Geneva, 348 F.3d. at 994, dissent to
denial of rehearing en banc. Judge Newman’s alternative solution would be to allow for the patenting of a
DCL in a limited manner. All competitors would be able to practice the prior art, whether or not it created
the patented DCL, but Schering would be able to bar competitors from creating new alternatives ways of
creating DCL. In this manner the DCL patent would be valid and capable of being exploited, but nothing
would be removed from the public domain.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Schering, 339 F.3d. at 1378-1379.
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claims at issue, regardless of whether PHOSITA recognized that presence of the
claims.110 Hence allowing the patenting of metabolites that had already been in use
unknowingly by the public would amount to the removal of the substance from the public
domain, something clearly impermissible under patent law.111 He went on in Schering to
state that the “extent of the inherent disclosure does not limit its anticipatory affect,” and,
coupled with his abandonment of the requirement for recognition by PHOSITA, creates a
situation where a substance that is non-obvious to PHOSITA, possesses utility, and is not
anticipated in the standard manner is, nonetheless, inherently anticipated and ineligible
for patent protection.112 In denying a patent to materials that otherwise qualify under 35
U.S.C. §§101-103, Judge Rader has made a policy determination regarding the
desirability of allowing patents that, while advancing the sciences, can reasonably be seen
as extending patent protection beyond twenty years.
Judge Newman, on the other hand, appears to be solely concerned with patent law
and does not address the public policy concern raised by Judge Rader. In her dissent to
the denial of rehearing en banc for Schering Judge Newman’s objections revolved around
the Circuit appearing to deny protection to patentablematerial. She focused on DCL’s
novelty and absence in the prior art.113 She then explained that the Schering inventor had
discovered DCL “in vivo as a degradation product of loratidine, isolated it, determined its
structure, and found its biologic properties. This panel nonetheless holds that this new
compound is unpatentable on the ground of ‘inherent anticipation.’”114 Judge Newman
then succinctly summarized her concern that no precedent supports the finding that a
110
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Id. at 1379-1380.
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Id. at 1378-1379.
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Schering, 348 F.3d. at 993.
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substance is “inherently anticipated” because it previously existed undiscovered.115
Judge Newman also objected to Schering’s abandonment of the Continental Can
requirement that there be recognition by PHOSITA to trigger inherent anticipation.116
She objects to the inflexible rule of inherent anticipation in Schering because it prohibits
the patenting of materials that, in her view, meet all the patentability requirements of 35
U.S.C. §§101-103.
The Federal Circuit chose to draw a hard line in Schering regarding the patenting
of metabolites. However, the issue of whether a party may patent byproducts had been
addressed by the court before, and, as would be guessed based on the severe differences
of opinion that emerged, the case law was mixed. There were those, such as Judge
Newman, who thought that PHOSITA needed to recognize the missing elements in order
to find anticipation by inherency. Others, such as Judge Rader, realized that the inherent
anticipation regimen was open to potential abuse by sophisticated patent holders who
sought to stagger patent applications for the byproducts of a single invention in order to
extend patent protection as long as possible. Both positions had substantial support for
their views within case law.117

115

Id.
Id. at 995. According to Schering’s counsel Schering had to develop “new, more sensitive testing
methods to detect DCL and other metabolites arising out of the ‘233 patent compounds.” Combined
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc by Plaintiff-Appellant, 2003 WL 24033460 at 5-6. If
this is true, then denying Schering additional patents for the ‘233 compounds allows others to capitalize off
Schering’s research and development, and makes it unlikely that Schering can recoup their costs.
117
Dan Burk and Mark Lemley, “Inherency,” 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 371(2005). Burk and Lemley
suggest an interesting theory to reconcile the conflicting views of the Federal Circuit. Their view is that the
Court will not grant further protection if the public has already been enjoying the benefit of the unpatented
claims. However, in formulating their theory Burk and Lemley attempt to reconcile decisions that predated
Judge Rader’s attempts to abandon Continental Can’s PHOSITA requirement, beginning with Atlas
Powder, MEHL/Biophile, EMI Group, and, of course, culminating with the full scale explicit abandonment
of the PHOSITA requirement in both Schering and SmithKline. By attempting to reconcile all the Federal
Circuit’s case law on inherent anticipation, Professors Burk and Lemley do not adequately appreciate the
seismic shift orchestrated by Judge Rader relating to inherent anticipation. To begin with, Burke and
Lemley incorrectly claim that the PHOSITA requirement is irrelevant because no cases pass upon the issue,
116
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Schering’s position has yet to be confirmed by the Federal Circuit en banc, but it
has received additional support from later panel decisions, including SmithKline Beecham

which is contained in the second prong of the Continental Can test. The reason for this is that the first
prong of the Continental Can case, which requires that the trait be shown to be inherently present, is a
threshold issue and a court must reach it in order to determine whether the issue of a case is inherent
anticipation or accidental anticipation. Since inherent anticipation is a somewhat convoluted concept, it is
not surprising that district courts, who rarely deal with such an issue, would not appreciate the high initial
standard of proof that must be reached. It must initially be shown that a trait is present “not by mere
possibility or probability,” In Re Oelrich, 666 at 581, to even reach the second prong of the Continental
Can test. The Seaborg case can be explained on this point because any presence of Americium in the
Fermi reactor was only theoretical and, while PHOSITA may have suspected its presence, no one could
sufficiently isolate are recognize Americium with any certainty until Seaborg. See, e.g. Finnegan Corp. v.
ITC, 180 F.3d. 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999)(holding that PHOSITA would not recognize the non-resonance
ejector of the prior art and is therefore not anticipated); In Re Shetty, 566 F.2d. at 84-85 (finding that
PHOSITA would not have recognized that a previous method to treat microbial infection in animals also
curbed appetite, and therefore the patent is not anticipated); see also, FN 71, supra. Next, there is a need
to draw a clear distinction between unpatentable inherent traits and inherent byproducts which still may
“advance the frontiers of science in a narrow field,” General Electric, 326 U.S. at 248-249. Cases such as
General Electric, Titanium Metals, and EMI Group merely claimed ever present traits within devices
whose discovery, while interesting, did not contribute independent utility. On this ground, the situations in
Schering and SmithKline can be clearly distinguished in that the compositions claimed have utility
independent of the original claim, and appear to have been non-obvious even to those in the art. Judge
Rader seemed gravely concerned that allowing additional patents on the metabolites of existing substances
would serve no purpose other than to lengthen patent protection for pharmaceutical companies. It is the
second portion of the Continental Can test that is meant to address Judge Rader’s concerns because it
protects the public by preventing the patenting of things known to “technologists in the field … albeit not
to judges,” Continental Can, 948 F.2d. at 1269. This objective test allows a court to ask what was known,
or should have been known, by PHOSITA in relation to a patent application. An interesting facet of the
PHOSITA requirement is that, unlike the test of obviousness, it is not frozen at the date of patenting. So,
something may not be known to PHOSITA originally and would therefore be eligible for patenting, but
once it became known by PHOSITA it would no longer be patentable. This test thereby protects both the
first discover and the public by allowing initial patentability but prohibiting it once it became known within
the field because, presumably, there had been sufficient time to apply for a patent and to delay until
PHOSITA generally recognizes a trait is unjustifiable. Lastly, the rule of Schering and SmithKline does not
seem to limit the inherent anticipation bar on patent to material which the public is “already receiving the
benefit.” In the Schering case there is no indication that the metabolite DCL was the active ingredient in
loratadine, rather DCL was an alternative form of a non-drowsy antihistamine. It is true that Schering
attempted to prevent competitors from practicing not only DCL but also loratadine after loratadine’s
original patent expired, but the Schering situation could have been addressed through patent misuse instead
of creating a blanket rule prohibiting patents. The SmithKline case creates a more clear example of the
public not receiving a benefit from the patented material. In that case, SmithKline created a hemihydrate
form of an original drug that was more easily manufactured because of its more stable form. SmithKline
then attempted to prevent all use of the prior art by claiming the hemihydrate form would appear upon
ingestion, although the hemihydrate also did not appear to affect the utility beyond its manufacturing
advantages. These cases indicate the Court does not view the public’s receipt of the benefit of a material to
be dispositive when determining inherent anticipation. The theory suggested by Professors Burk and
Lemley has some initial appeal but it fails to recognize the Court’s recent shift in its approach to inherent
anticipation, and it seems to be largely a post hoc rationalization of the Court’s opinions that is unworkable
in practice.
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Corporation v. Apotex Corporation (the “PAXIL case”).118 In that case the Federal
Circuit vacated a previous panel decision that invalidated a patent based on the finding
that clinical trials constituted public use and remanded the case back to the Judge Rader’s
panel for further proceedings.119 The basis of Judge Rader’s second opinion in the
“Paxil” case did not likely surprise the Circuit since his first opinion in SmithKline found
inherent anticipation would be alternative ground for invalidating the “Paxil” patent.120
Thus, when the Circuit vacated Judge Rader’s first opinion, it could be said to have
endorsed both his view of inherent anticipation and his determination to use his revised
version of the doctrine to pass upon the “Paxil” patent.
Had Schering been decided en banc, the questions surrounding the legitimacy of
an appellate panel ignoring circuit precedent could have been avoided. But it is likely the
issue of whether unrecognized metabolites should be precluded from receiving separate
patents would have been a persistent issue because, as explained in greater detail infra,
the Court’s view of public policy appears, in some respects, to contravene the general
policy created by Congress through the Hatch-Waxman Act.
B. Cases Supporting Judge Newman’s View of Inherent Anticipation
Judge Newman’s view that inherent anticipation requires recognition from
PHOSITA is consistent with the policy that was slowly developed by the courts regarding
anticipation by inherency. The Supreme Court first addressed some form of inherent
anticipation in 1890 with the Tilghman v. Proctor case.121 Later cases, such as Edison
118

SmithKline Beecham Corporation v. Apotex Corporation, 403 F.3d. 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
SmithKline, 365 F.3d. 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated en banc by SmithKline, 403 F.3d. 1328 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
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Id. at 1320.
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Tilghman, 102 U.S. 707. See FN 11, supra. Inherent anticipation would become an offshoot of
accidental anticipation. The Court in Tilghman recognized that Tilghman was entitled to a patent and
developed a doctrine of non recognized anticipation that would allow them to issue Tilghman a patent.
119
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Electric Light Co. v. Novelty Incandescent Light Co.122 and Eibel Process Co. v.
Minnesota and Ontario Paper123 reiterated the view that a creation whose value was not
recognized nor appreciated did not constitute prior art.124 These cases are now
categorized as incidences of “accidental anticipation,” but it is notable that originally a
threshold question when considering anticipation was whether PHOSITA recognized the
value of the invention.125
The case of In Re Seaborg supports Judge Newman’s position.126 In Seaborg the
material being patented was Americium, also known as element 95, as well as the
accompanying isotopes and methods of producing and purifying the element.127
Difficulty in the patenting process arose because Americium had almost certainly been
produced in the prior art Fermi reactor.128 However, the presence of Americium was
impossible to prove because the maximum amount that could have been produced had the
reactor ran for 100 days at 500 kilowatts was no more than one-billionth of a gram, which
would be interspersed with 40 tons of highly radioactive reactor fuel.129 Even if it had
been possible to safely measure the amount of Americium present, the technology of the
time would not have allowed for certain confirmation of its presence.130 The Seaborg
court ultimately concluded that the prior art would not allow for the creation of

Courts later recognized that their focus on non-recognition was capable of being expanded to situations
where the unrecognized trait is always present. Allowing the Tilghman rule to be applied to these cases
would extend patent protection and potentially encourage willful blindness. As a result inherent
anticipation was developed to deny patents in those situations.
122
Edison Electric Light Co., 167 F. 977. See FN 11, supra.
123
Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
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Id. at 66.
125
See FN 38, supra, for a list of factors to differentiate “accidental anticipation” from “inherent
anticipation.”
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In Re Seaborg, 328 F.2d. 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 997.
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Id.
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Americium “without the exercise of more than ordinary skill in the art.”131 Based on the
conclusion that PHOSITA would not have been able to create Americium from the prior
art a patent was granted over the examiner’s original denial.132
The precedent seemed well established by the time the C.C.P.A. considered the
case of In re Shetty.133 The Shetty case pertained to a method of “curbing appetite in
animals by administering certain adamantane compounds.”134 The Patent and Trademark
Board of Appeals originally denied all claims as “analogous” to the prior art and
therefore obvious or anticipated.135 The Court affirmed the Appeals Board’s decision as
to one claim, but reversed the Board on the other five claims.136 In the case of the five
claims that were allowed to issue, the C.C.P.A. stated that they were not convinced that
131

Seaborg, 328 F.2d. at 999.
Id. An interesting question arises- what if Americium could have been proved, during the life of the
Seaborg patent, to be produced by the Fermi patented reactor? At that point is it possible to invalidate the
patent as inherently anticipated? If not, does anyone using the Fermi reactor become an infringer? The
natural answer would be that, if the patent is valid, a patent holder should not be permitted to prevent others
from using prior art that has passed into the public domain. This was the view that Judge Newman
suggested in Schering, but appears to have been rejected by Judge Rader. A second view would be to allow
for de minimus use of the patented product. This second view was suggested by Judge Posner, sitting by
designation, in SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F.Supp. 2d. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2003), in a case
involving the “seeding” of a patented product in prior art. “Seeding” could have occurred in this case if
anyone attempting to experiment with the prior art ‘196 patent used the ‘723 in experimentation.
SmithKline, 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1024. Seeding can occur if the ‘723 material is handled roughly or dropped,
and molecules break off. Once a seed of ‘723 material enters the manufacturing facility of the ‘196
material it begins to convert the ‘196 substance to the ‘723 substance, Id. at 1023. However, the ‘196
substance would reach a saturation point at a percentage points, but any manufacturing advantage would
require results in the “high double digits.” Id., at 1024-1025 There was also testimony at the trial court
that once a facility was seeded it would almost be impossible to “unseed” it. Id., 247 F.Supp. 2d. at 1021.
Judge Rader, in SmithKline Beecham Corp v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d. 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2004), vacated
en banc, SmithKline, 403 F.3d 1328, rejected the view that policy may affect claim construction and
rejected the suggestion of a de minimus exception to infringement. He did however leave open the
possibility that a claim, which would make infringers of those using the prior art, may be invalid for
indefiniteness in violation of 35 U.S.C. §112. This case presents a somewhat analogous situation to the one
addressed in this paper, but there is a significant difference…in the Seaborg case the Americium is a
byproduct that is probably unrelated to the utility of the prior art and its presence was theoretical. In the
SmithKline situation, the previously unknown byproduct is related to the utility of the prior art, not to the
consumer but in the manufacturing process. Furthermore, SmithKline wanted to prevent all creation of the
hemihydrate, including creation that occurred by practicing the prior art.
133
In re Shetty, 566 F.2d. 81 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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Id. at 81.
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Id. at 84-85. The prior art had actually been used combat microbial infestation, but such actions can
arguably inhibit appetite.
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Id. at 86.
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since Shetty’s method corresponded or inhered to the prior art that it was obvious.137 The
Court went on to state that “inherency is quite immaterial if, as the record establishes
here, one of ordinary skill in the art would not appreciate or recognize the inherent
result.”138 Once again, more than a dozen years after Seaborg the Court’s primary
concern when considering inherency was whether PHOSITA would have recognized the
inherent result.
A similar situation arose in In Re Oelrich four years later.139 Like Shetty, the
Oelrich case dealt with the patenting of a process that was arguably anticipated by the
prior art.140 In Oelrich, the patent claims involved a means for generating a “low inertia”
carrier frequency to steer the fins of guided missiles.141 The prior art involved “high
inertia” carrier frequencies that Oelrich admitted would occasionally fall within the range
of his stated frequencies.142 The Court approved the patent and declared that
[inherency] could not be established by probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a
thing might occur is not sufficient … [but] if the disclosure is sufficient to show that the
natural result flowing from the operation … of the questioned function, it seems well
settled that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.143

In Oelrich, the major issue concerned the inherency of an unknown function that Oelrich
claimed to discover.144 The court, in determining that the claims were not inherent within
the prior art did not reach the issue of whether PHOSITA would have recognized the
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claim.145 Based on the parallel analysis of the C.C.P.A. with Shetty, the Court would
have addressed recognition by PHOSITA if inherency had been found.146
Judge Newman authored the Federal Circuit’s decision for In Re Spada.147 The
Spada case dealt with “pressure sensitive adhesives and manufactured articles.”148 These
adhesives were created by using “polymers of the same monomers, in overlapping ratios
of components” as the prior art, but created a product “quite different” from the prior
art.149 Based on the prior art Smith reference the examiner determined that a prima facie
case existed that Spada’s invention was unpatentable as anticipated.150 Newman found
that the virtual identity of the monomers was disclosed in the prior art, as was the
procedure necessary to create the monomers, and the reference described the applicant’s
claimed invention “sufficiently to have placed a person of ordinary skill in the field of the
invention in possession of it.”151 Since the products were described sufficiently to enable
PHOSITA to be in possession of them, the claimed invention was anticipated
notwithstanding the differences in the final products.152
In 1995 the Federal Circuit considered the case of a polymorph version of a
previously patented composition.153 In Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., Glaxo created and
received a patent on ranitidine hydrochloride, a “powerful histamine blocker, inhibiting
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Id.
See, e.g., In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Judge Newman outlines the anticipation
analysis as 1) all the elements of a claimed invention must be described in a single reference, and 2) the
reference must be sufficient to place PHOSITA in possession of it. See also FN 71, supra.
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In Re Spada, 911 F.2d. 705.
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Id. at 706.
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the secretion of stomach acid.”154 Two years after the original patent issued in 1978
(U.S. Patent No. 4,128,658, “the ‘658 patent”) Glaxo used a more efficient new method
to manufacture the ‘658 material.155 The new process, at one point, created the ‘658
material into a crystalline version, or polymorph version of the original ranitidine
hydrochloride.156 This version was better suited for commercial production and a second
patent was issued covering this new composition (U.S. Patent No. 4,521,431, “the ‘431
patent”).157 Further tests showed that practicing the new version of manufacture for the
‘658 material did not always produce the ‘431 material.158 In 1991 Novopharm, a Glaxo
competitor, filed an ANDA seeking to practice the ‘431 patent in December of 1995,
which was the expiration of the ‘658 patent, but well before the 2002 expiration of the
‘431 patent.159 Novopharm asserted that the ‘431 patent was anticipated by the ‘658
patent, and Glaxo sued for technical infringement as permitted by 35 U.S.C.
§271(e)(2).160 In Glaxo, the court held that a claim is only anticipated, either expressly or
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Id. In this case it appears that Novopharm had no interest in practicing the ‘658 patent, but hoped that it
would provide it a basis to invalidate the ‘431 patent. Glaxo does not appear to have had any objection to
Novopharm practicing the ‘658 patent, perhaps because it was aware that Novopharm had no interest in
actually practicing the ‘658 patent. However, compare Glaxo’s behavior to that of Schering and
SmithKline in Schering and SmithKline. In those cases Schering and SmithKline attempted to completely
prohibit the practice of the prior art, and both found their patents to be invalidated through inherent
anticipation. In this case Glaxo did not attempt to prevent practice of the ‘658 patent despite the knowledge
that at some point it would likely morph into the ‘431 form, and the legal outcome for the ‘431 patent was
much better than for the patents covering DCL and Paxil. The Federal Circuit may have been partly
reacting in those cases to the overreaching of both Schering and SmithKline, or it may have taken time to
develop a new view on inherency. It is also possible that the facts dictated a different outcome. In both
Schering and SmithKline the claimed compositions were metabolites inherent within the claimed
composition upon ingestion, whereas that was not the situation in this case. However, the court does go on
to require, in dicta, that inherency be recognized by PHOSITA, which was not shown to be the case in
either Schering or SmithKline.
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inherently, if all the limitations are contained within a single piece of prior art.161 But, in
order to be anticipated by inherency, it is necessary that the inherency would “be
appreciated by one of ordinary skill in the art.”162 The district court had concluded that
the ‘658 patent did not inevitably result in the creation of the polymorph covered by the
‘431 patent, so anticipation did not exist. The Federal Circuit found this holding not to be
clearly erroneous.163
Continental Can marked the last occasion where Judge Rader and Judge Newman
agreed on a case of inherency, although they would later vociferously disagree as to the
actual scope of the case’s holding.164 In Continental Can, the controversy concerned
whether a prior art process to produce cans necessarily produced “hollow” ribs, even
though all sides agreed that the ribs were not shown as hollow in the patent.165 Judge
Newman stated thatwhere inherency is to be found it is necessary to refer to extrinsic
evidence, but such evidence must make clear that “the missing descriptive matter is
necessarily present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so
recognized by persons of ordinary skill.”166 The Court vacated summary judgment on the
issue of inherency because there was conflicting expert testimony as to whether “hollow”
ribs were necessarily created.167 Later, in Schering, Judge Rader claimed that
“Continental Can does not stand for the proposition that an inherent feature of a prior art
reference must be perceived as such by a person of ordinary skill in the art before the
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Continental Can Company USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Company, 948 F.2d. 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For more
on Newman’s and Rader’s subsequent disagreement as to the holding of the Continental Can case see FNs
18, 19, and 69, supra.
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critical date.”168 He instead stated that the holding of the case was that summary
judgment was inappropriate when there was conflicting expert testimony.169 Technically,
Judge Rader is correct; the case was remanded for a determination on the first part of the
articulated test, so Judge Newman’s two part test for inherent anticipation is dicta.170
Ultimately, the Continental Can case was remanded for a determination of whether the
“hollow” ribs would be inevitably created since inherency cannot be established by
“possibilities or probabilities.”171 However, Judge Newman’s test, which required
PHOSITA recognition of the inherent presence of the missing descriptive matter to
trigger inherent anticipation, is well supported by the prior case law, discussed supra.172
Subsequent to Continental Can, the Federal Circuit required recognition by
PHOSITA in order to find anticipation by inherency in Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite
Company.173 The Rosco case concerned convex school bus “cross-view” mirrors.174
Rosco owned the ‘357 design patent (U.S. Design Patent No. 346,357, “the ‘357 design
patent”) which covered an “oval, highly convex cross-view mirror with a black, flat metal
backing.”175 Mirror Lite’s ‘984 utility patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,589,984, “the ‘984
patent”) covered an “oval cross-view mirror with a varying radius of curvature along the
major axis of the convex ellipsoid mirrorlens.”176 Rosco’s ‘357 design patent was filed in
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Id. See, Rosco Corp. v.Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d. 1373, 1380-1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Finnegan
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April of 1992 and issued in April of 1994 and predated Mirror Lite’s patent that had a
priority date of September of 1992.177 Both companies sued one another based on
infringement of each other’s respective patents.178 Rosco also alleged that Mirror Lite’s
‘984 patent was inherently anticipated by its own ‘357 design patent because anyone
practicing their design patent would create a mirror with a varying radius of curvature.179
The district court granted summary judgment to Rosco on its claim of inherent
anticipation, but the Federal Circuit reversed.180 The Court stated that in order for
inherent anticipation to apply, it must be shown that the missing element is “necessarily
present in the thing described in the reference, and that it would be so recognized by a
person of ordinary skill.”181 The relevant question was not whether the use of a “vacuum
thermoforming process” inherently resulted in a “varying radius of curvature along the
major axis,” but rather whether “one skilled in the [would] art read the ‘357 design patent
as showing the varying radius of curvature.”182 The record did not show that PHOSITA
would have recognized the ‘357 design patent as inherently disclosing the ‘984 patent, so
summary judgment was inappropriate.183
Crown Operations v. Solutia Inc, decided just a year before Schering, confirms
that inherent anticipation requires recognition by PHOSITA.184 Crown Operations
involved layered films in glass that improve the safety and performance of the glass, most
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notably windshields.185 The patented films resist shattering while also limiting visual
distortion by ensuring that visible light reflection was limited to two percent or less,
whereas prior solar films permitted reflection of three percent or greater.186 The District
Court found Solutia’spate nt (U.S. Patent No. 4,973,511, “the ‘511 patent”) to be valid on
summary judgment against an invalidity argument of inherent anticipation.187 The
Federal Circuit affirmed: “if the two percent reflectance limitation is inherently disclosed
by the [prior art] patent, it must be necessarily present and a person of ordinary skill in
the art would [be presumed to] recognize its presence.”188 Also, the inherent presence
must be established, as a preliminary matter, as something that is more than a “possibility
or probability.”189 In this case the Court found that Crown had failed to carry its
evidentiary burden of showing the two percent limitation to be necessarily present in the
‘661 patent.190
Finally, the case of Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation may havebeen the
initial moment that the two schools of thought regarding inherent anticipation, as
represented by Judges Newman and Rader, came into open conflict.191 Judge Newman
authored the opinions in this case, which dealt with a “recipe” to make transgenic
mice.192 The District Court invalidated Elan’s ‘486 and ‘003 patents (U.S. Patent No.
5,612,486, “the ‘486 patent” and U.S. Patent No. 5,850,003, “the ‘003 patent”) as being
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anticipated by the Mullan ‘169 patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,455,169, “the ‘169 patent).193
The Federal Circuit originally reversed this decision because the legal requirements of
anticipation had not been met.194 The ‘169 patent was granted to Mullan after he located
a Swedish family susceptible to Alzheimer’s disease, isolated the mutated gene and its
protein and expressed the mutation.195 Mullan, however, never produced a transgenic
animal.196 The Elan ‘486 and ‘003 patents encompass the method of production, which
experts agreed was unpredictable, and the characteristics of transgenic mice.197 Judge
Newman once again states that a finding of inherent anticipation requires that the
limitation be inherently present and that the missing elements in a reference be
recognized by PHOSITA as being present.198 Judge Newman’s opinion pointed out that
the Mullan patent did nothing but point out broad recitations of known procedures to
make transgenic mice, and, to support the finding of no inherency, pointed out that the
mouse produced by Mayo using the Mullan patent technology was the 2,576th mouse
screened.199 Based on the shortcomings of the Mullan patent, Judge Newman determined
that Mayo had failed to support its contention that the Elan patents were anticipated
inherently.200
Judge Dyk dissented expressing concern that the Court was allowing for the
patenting of “existing inventions.” He said “[while] Elan may have recognized something
quite interesting… it has simply not invented anything new.”201 Furthermore, Judge Dyk
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believed that the decision contradicted case law “recently recognized in In Re
Cruciferous Sprout Litigation … On the issue of inherency ‘it matters not that those of
ordinary skill heretofore have not recognized these inherent characteristics.’”202 Either
Judge Dyk was extremely persuasive, or he recognized that the Federal Circuit’s position
regarding inherency appeared to be shifting, because the court granted a rehearing en
banc, which subsequently vacated Judge Newman’s first Elan decision.203 In her second
panel decision Judge Newman carefully avoided the issue of inherent anticipation.204
Instead, she chose to base her decision on a lack of enablement.205 She stated that prior
art must be enabling to inherently anticipate, although, in Newman’s opinion, enablement
by itself is not sufficient to find inherent anticipation.206 The Mullan patent, while citing
numerous possible methods to produce a mouse, did not suggest which method might
reasonably be expected to successfully produce a transgenic mouse.207 The case was
remanded for a determination of whether the Mullan patent enabled PHOSITA to create a
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transgenic mouse without undue experimentation, while avoiding the issue of whether the
Mullan patent was inherently anticipated.208
Judge Newman’s position in her Schering dissent that inherent anticipation
requires recognition by PHOSITA seems to be well supported by precedent, but it would
also appear that she did not recognize the shift that was occurring within the Federal
Circuit regarding matters of inherent anticipation.209 However, her position seems quite
sensible from a case law standpoint. Judge Newman’s focus is on whether the subject
matter could have been patented sooner. If it could have been, then an additional patent,
without a terminal disclaimer, should not be permitted; but if PHOSITA could not, and
did not, recognize the subject matter then science has been advanced and a patent is
appropriate. This position seems to be driven primarily out of a concern for patent law,
in contrast to Judge Rader’s position, which appears to be dictated primarily by public
policy concerns.
C. Cases Supporting Judge Rader’s View of Inherent Anticipation
Judge Rader’s position also enjoys substantial support. However the cases that
most support his contention that PHOSITA need not recognize an inherent property to
disqualify that invention from patenting are fairly recent.
An oldest case that can arguably stand for the proposition that recognition by
PHOSITA is unnecessary to support a finding of inherent anticipation is Titanium Metals
Corp. of America v. Banner.210 This case involved a patent for titanium alloy in which
the applicants claimed that their invention was the recognition of the preferable qualities
208
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of corrosion resistance, strength, and “ductility” which improves the welding properties
of the alloy.211 Both the examiner and the board rejected the patent application as being
obvious to PHOSITA in light of a Russian article that predated the patent application by
five years.212 The applicants then commenced a civil action and the District Court for the
District of Colombia ordered the patent to issue.213 The Federal Circuit reversed the
lower court and stated that “Congress has not seen fit to permit the patenting of an old
alloy…by one who has discovered its corrosion resistance or other useful properties.”214
The Court seems to acknowledge, arguendo, that the applicants were the first to
specifically discover these inherent properties in the alloys.215 However, it stated that
“claims cannot be obtained to that which is not new” and the Russian article was found to
be sufficient to disclose the alloys, regardless of whether all accompanying properties
were also disclosed.216 By acknowledging that the applicants did discover the properties
inherent within the alloys, but are nonetheless prohibited from receiving a patent, the
Court seems to downplay the importance of recognition by PHOSITA in the inherent
anticipation analysis.217 It should be noted that this case revolved around recognition of a
trait of the prior art without creating anything new. Had a patent been granted then the
titanium alloys in question would have been completely removed from the public domain
without contributing anything that is, in itself, distinctly patentable. The facts of this case
are analogous to those of General Electric v. Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co. where the
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court specifically found that discovery of a pre-existing trait within a prior art reference
does not impart patentability.218
Soon after Titanium Metals the Court ruled, in Verdegaal Brothers v. Union Oil
Company of California, that recognition by PHOSITA was not necessary to reach a
finding of inherency.219 Verdegall Brothers involved the infringement of a process for
making liquid fertilizer by first mixing the elements in a “nutritive heat sink” to absorb
heat- known as a “heel.”220

A “heel” is nothing more than a previously mixed batch of

liquid fertilizer.221 Verdegall Brothers owned a patent on the process of making liquid
fertilizer by adding sulfuric acid rapidly to the heel (U.S. Patent No. 4,310,343, “the ‘343
patent”).222 The prior art Stoller patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,315,763, “the ‘763 patent”)
also called for the creation of a heel.223 Verdegaal Brothers attempted to distinguish their
patent as novel by claiming that the Stoller patent did not “recognize the ‘inventive
concept’ that the heel functioned as a heat sink.”224 The Court rejected this argument and
stated that Union Oil’s burden “was limited to establishing that Stoller disclosed the same
process. It did not have the additional burden of proving that Stoller recognized the heat
sink capabilities of using a heel.”225 The Court went further and declared “even assuming
Stoller did not recognize that the heel of his process functioned as a heat sink, that
property was inherently possessed by the heel in his disclosed process, and, thus, his
process anticipates the claimed invention.”226 Once again, the Court seems to shy away
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from the importance of recognition by PHOSITA and stated a willingness to invalidate
the ‘343 patent even if the prior art reference did not recognize that the heel functioned as
a heat sink.227 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s verdict of infringement
as being unsupported by substantial evidence since the ‘763 patent inherently anticipated
all the properties of the ‘343 patent.228
Another example of knowledge by PHOSITA not being necessary to prevent
patenting of a product can be found in Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva
Pharmaceuticals.229 In this case Byron Chemical Company, Inc., an Australian
company, sold three lots of anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride between 1989-1991.230
Two lots were sold to Geneva Pharmaceuticals and one lot to Warner Chilcott
Laboratories.231 Abbott Labs subsequently developed the same anhydrous terazosin
hydrochloride independently and began to market it as “Form IV” of a medication to treat
hypertension and “benign prostatic hyperplasia.”232 The patent application for Abbott’s
“Form IV” anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride was filed October 18, 1994 (U.S. Patent
No. 5,504,207, “the ‘207 patent”).233 Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Novopharm Ltd., and
Invamed, Inc. filed ANDAs to market generic versions of Form IV and alleged that the
‘207 patent was invalid as being on sale for more than one year.234 Abbott countered that
neither Byron Chemical nor the defendants knew that they were dealing with “Form IV”,
and since they “did not ‘conceive’ the subject matter [of the transaction] … there was no
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invention on sale.”235 The Court rejected this argument and said what is important is that
the three commercial sales before the critical date occurred, and the knowledge of the
parties is irrelevant.236 “[I]f a product that is offered for sale inherently possesses each of
the limitations of the claims, then the invention is on sale, whether or not the parties to
the transactions recognize that the product possesses the claimed characteristics.”237
Abbot Labs is consistent with Judge Rader’s view that recognition by PHOSITA of
inherent properties is not relevant in determining whether a patent may issue. Judge
Rader himself explained this view quite clearly in Atlas Powder Company v. Ireco Inc.,
which was decided a month after Abbott Labs.238
Atlas Powder Case involved two patents for explosive compositions (U.S. Patent
No. 4,111,727, “the Clay patent;” and U.S. Patent No. RE 33,788, “the reissue
patent”).239 The district court found the patents to be invalid as anticipated by either the
‘551 patent (U.S. Patent No. 3,161,551, “the Egly patent”) or by the foreign ‘546 patent
(U.K. Patent No. 1,306,546, “the Butterworth patent”).240 Neither of the prior art patents
cited the specific composition of the Clay or of the reissue patent, but the prior art patents
disclosed the same chemical compositions as the Clay and reissue patents in overlapping
amounts.241 In affirming the district court, Judge Rader stated that the only limitation not
arguably within the prior art patents is the requirement that there be “sufficient aeration”
235
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in the composition.242 This limitation was found to be “inevitably and inherently” present
within the prior art and the claims were unpatentable because the discovery of a
“previously unappreciated property of a prior art composition … does not render the old
composition patentably new.”243 Thus, even assuming that the applicants in this case did
initially discover the property of the prior art composition, that trait is unpatentable
regardless of the fact that there was no recognition by PHOSITA because the properties
were inherently present within the prior art.244 It is worth noting, however, that Judge
Rader, while attempting to make clear that recognition by PHOSITA is not necessary to
trigger inherent anticipation, explicitly found that “those of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the patent application was filed knew [of the importance of aeration].”245 Judge
Rader’s conclusion was that since “sufficient aeration was inherent in the prior art, it is
irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of [the claimed
invention].”246 So in the Atlas Powder case Judge Rader made it clear that the claimed
invention was inherent in the prior art, and there was recognition by PHOSITA of the
claimed “aeration”; but also believed that there was no need to find recognition by
PHOSITA of the inherent trait in order to trigger anticipation by inherency.
Judge Rader’s apparent discomfort with explicitly abandoning the requirement for
recognition by PHOSITA comes to fore again a month after Atlas Powder in
MEHL/Biophile International Corp. v. Milgraum.247 In this case the plaintiffs sued the
defendants for infringing their patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,059,192, “the ‘192 patent”)
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covering a method to remove hair using a laser that destroys “the papilla, thereby
preventing hair regrowth.”248 The District Court granted summary judgment of invalidity
based on a manual that anticipated all claims.249 Judge Rader affirmed the invalidity of
the patent, but based his holding on “the Polla article,” which disclosed all elements of
the patent, rather than the manual cited by the district court. He stated that if the
“disclosure is sufficient to show that the natural result flowing from the operation as
taught would result in the performance of the questioned function, it seems well settled
that the disclosure should be regarded as sufficient.”250 Rader goes on to state “where, as
here, the result is a necessary consequence of what was deliberately intended, it is of no
importance that the article’s authors did not appreciate the results.”251 He added that
“inherency is not necessarily conterminous with knowledge of those of ordinary skill in
the art. Artisans of ordinary skill may not recognize the inherent characteristics or
functioning of prior art.”252 But, once again, Judge Rader covers his bases and states that
“it is not a question of probabilities as to whether a person of ordinary skill following the
teachings of the article will align the laser light applicator over a hair follicle,” because
the Polla article dealt with guinea pigs and “[n]o one disputes that guinea pigs have hairy
backs.”253 So, while attempting, in dicta, to claim that no recognition by PHOSITA is
necessary Judge Rader ensures, in making his finding of inherent anticipation, that
everyone understands the claimed results of the invention are inevitable and recognition
by PHOSITA is present.
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After Atlas and MEHL/Biophile, Judge Rader’s next opportunity to address the
issue of inherent anticipation was EMI Group North America v. Cypress
Semiconductor.254 EMI concerned two patents owned by EMI for metallic fuses for
semi-conductor chips (U.S. Patent No. 4,826,785, “the ‘785 patent” and U.S. Patent No.
4,935,801, “the ‘801 patent”).255 The ‘801 patent “claims a structure for a metallic fuse
with an optically absorptive upper layer, and the ‘785 patent claims a method for
fabricating and blowing a fuse.”256 Manufacturers “blow” dysfunctional links in a chips
using a laser beam to sever the connectors, and chips are built with redundant circuits to
allow for this.257 An expert testified at trial that the claimed method of a theoretical
vapor-induced explosion was impossible because the metal would expand under the heat
of the laser and crack the corners of the fuse, destroying the chip.258 The expert believed
that if he was wrong, and such an explosion was possible without destroying the chip,
then the explosive mechanism claimed in the fuse would be inherent in all similar prior
art fuses.259 Judge Rader found that several prior art fuses disclosed the claimed fused
structure that would make such a severing process possible without destroying the chips,
although the previous inventors had not recognized the trait.260 It was enough that the
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prior art disclosed the structure of the fuse because doing so “inherently discloses the law
of nature by which the fuses are able to rupture under the heat of a laser.”261
The case of In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation is a great example of exactly the
type of policy matters that Judge Rader seems most concerned with in his attempt to
abandon the requirement that PHOSITA recognize an inherent trait for anticipation to be
triggered.262 This case, which involved neither Judge Rader nor Judge Newman, revolves
around method patents for growing and eating sprouts to reduce the risk of cancer (U.S.
Patent No. 5,725,895, “the ‘895 patent”; U.S. Patent No. 5,968,567, “the ‘567 patent”;
and U.S. Patent No. 5,968,505, “the ‘505 patent”).263 The patent applicants discovered
that sprouts induce Phase 2 enzymes, which in turn reduce the level of carcinogens.264
The panel agreed with Judge Rader’s position that recognition by PHOSITA was not
necessary for inherent anticipation to apply.265 They stated that the carcinogen reducing
characteristics of a sprout are “inherent characteristics” and it does not matter that those
of ordinary skill have not recognized the traits.266
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The Court in the Cruciferous Sprout case was grappling with the troubling
corollary of Judge Newman’s PHOSITA rule: if someone finds an inherent trait that was
specifically unrecognized but whose end result was known, that individual should
technically, under the PHOSITA rule, be entitled to a patent. In this case, people know
that it is healthy to eat sprouts, but did not know that cruciferous sprouts induced Phase 2
enzymes that reduced carcinogens and, in turn, cancer. Yet, despite being technically
qualified for a patent under the PHOSITA rule, something did not seem right about
granting a patent in this instance, and doing so could make potential infringers of anyone
attempting to practice the prior art. Likewise, in the Schering case, which followed
Cruciferous Sprout by a year, anyone practicing the prior art loratadine could have been
infringing on the new DCL patent.267 To address this problem Rader attempted to
abandon the PHOSITA rule altogether in Schering and instead prohibit patents for
inherent results regardless of whether there was, or could have been, recognition by
PHOSITA prior to the patent application.268 This rule serves public policy by ensuring
that the public is never threatened with infringement from practicing the prior art and
ensures that material in the public domain remains in the public domain. But the rule
also bypasses several alternative, less severe methods of ensuring this goal, like Judge
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wisdom” relating to elevated levels of homocysteine. But complicating matters is the fact that Lab Corp
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Newman’s suggestion that Schering may not prevent others from practicing the prior
art.269
Judge Rader’s view rejecting the need for recognition by PHOSITA was well
received in the subsequent decision of The Toro Company v. Deere & Company.270 In
the Toro case the Federal Circuit made clear that the new rule, that recognition by
PHOSITA was no longer required to find anticipation by inherency, was applicable
across the board and not limited to situations concerning metabolites.271 The Toro case
involved a method to treat turf by aerating the turf with sporadic injections of liquid
fertilizer (U.S. Patent No. 5,207,168, “the ‘168 patent”).272 John Deere alleged that
Toro’s patents were anticipated by the prior art patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,907,516, “the
‘516 patent”) which also dealt with pulse injections.273 John Deere alleged that practicing
the ‘516 patent would lead to infringement of the Toro patents because the prior art
taught all the spacing and pressure parameters that would lead to the aeration Toro
claimed.274 The District Court denied John Deere’s motion for summary judgment
because, among other reasons, it found that PHOSITA would not have recognized the
Toro characteristics at the time the ‘516 patent was filed.275 The Federal Circuit
corrected the district court on this subject and stated “the fact that a characteristic is a
necessary feature or result of a prior art embodiment … is enough for inherent
anticipation, even if that fact was unknown at the time prior to invention.”276 Ultimately,
the Court upheld the district court’s denial of summary judgment because John Deere did
269
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not supply adequate evidence to support such a judgment, but the matter was remanded
for a determination of the validity of the ‘168 patent.277
Another Federal Circuit panel also endorsed Schering’s holding in the
pharmaceutical context and found that recognition by PHOSITA is not necessary to find
invalidity due to inherent anticipation. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.
involves the antidepressant drug PAXIL®. The case was originally tried before Circuit
Court Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation.278 PAXIL® was developed over a
long period of time. The initial patent for paroxetine was first obtained in 1977 by a
British company called Ferrosan (U.S. Patent No. 4,007,196, “the ‘196 patent”).279
Ferrosan then licensed the ‘196 patent to SmithKline.280 The ‘196 patent covered an
“anhydrous” form of the paroxetine. Because they can become “soggy”, anhydrous
materials are difficult to manufacture because of the special care that must be taken to
maintain their viability.281 In 1985, however, a SmithKline researcher realized the
material had naturally morphed into a “pseudo polymorph,” known as a hemihydrate,
which is much more stable and easily manufactured than the original anhydrous version
of the drug.282 SmithKline received a second patent for this new version of paroxetine
(U.S. Patent No. 4,721,723, “the ‘723 patent”).283 This second patent began to be
marketed as PAXIL® in 1993.284
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Complications soon arose due to the nature of the anhydrous version of
paroxetine.285 The original ‘196 patent on peroxetine expired in 1992; however, when
Apotex announced plans in 1998 to work with the ‘196 patent to make a generic version
of anhydrous peroxetine, SmithKline sued them.286 SmithKline’s complaint was that any
version of the ‘196 material was likely to contain some ammount of the ‘723
hemihydrate, whose patent would not expire until 2006.287 The basis for SmithKline’s
claims were that, first, the ‘196 patent is likely morph into the protected hemihydrate
form of peroxtine, which is how SmithKline originally discovered the ‘723 material.288
Second, even if the ‘196 material did not morph into the ‘723 material it is highly likely
that any Apotex manufacturing location would be “seeded” with PAXIL®.289 The
“seeding” phenomenon is likely to occur anytime that the ‘723 material is handled
roughly and small crystals come lose and then implant in the ‘196 material; the ‘723
material will then multiply within the ‘196 material to a saturation point, within
pharmaceutical manufacturing plants, of several percent.290 Lastly, SmithKline claims
that even if Apotex can prevent any of the ‘196 material from morphing into the ‘723
material, infringement will occur when a patient ingests the ‘196 material because small
amounts of the ‘723 material will invariably be created within their damp, wet
stomachs.291
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Judge Posner addressed the concern of natural morphing of the ‘196 material to a
hemihydrate by limiting protectability of the ‘723 patent to “commercially significant
amounts.”292 He then limited the ability of SmithKline to allege infringement due to
“seeding” by creating an equitable defense that the patent holder caused the
infringement.293 Posner further justified this defense by stating that to hold otherwise
would allow SmithKline more protection for the ‘723 patent than patent law intended.294
Judge Posner also ruled that Apotex had not shown to his satisfaction that the ‘196 patent
will inherently contain the ‘723 material, thereby allowing the ‘723 patent to be valid
over a claim of anticipation by inherency.295 Judge Posner’s ultimate conclusion was that
the ‘723 patent was valid but not infringed.296
Judge Rader authored the two subsequent opinions in SmithKline. In the initial
panel decision, Judge Rader rejected nearly all of Judge Posner’s conclusions but
ultimately found the patent to be invalid for public use.297 Among Rader’s conclusions
were that it was error to limit the claims in the ‘723 patent to commercially significant
amounts because claim construction is “not a policy driven inquiry,” and the proper claim
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construction of the ‘723 patent encompassed all hemihydrate.298 Also, he concluded that
the previous Judge, from whom Judge Posner took over the case but by whose procedural
decisions Posner was bound, abused his discretion in failing to hear evidence on
SmithKline’s claims of contributory infringement through ingestion.299 Additionally,
while he understood that Posner was concerned about the implications of finding Apotex
liable for infringement that occurred by practicing something in the public domain,
Posner’s equitable defense was not necessary since the patent could be dispensed with on
alternative grounds.300 Rader then invalidated the patent for being in public use under
§102(b) by reasoning that the individuals taking part in the clinical tests were not bound
by confidentiality.301 Amazingly, Rader passed on the initial opportunity to invalidate the
‘723 patent for inherent anticipation despite the fact that SmithKline alleged infringement
through in vivo degradation, and despite his specifically warning SmithKline that success
on that allegation would result in invalidation of the patent for inherent anticipation.302
The Circuit then vacated the panel decision en banc and remanded the matter
back to Judge Rader’s panel, knowing his likely decision would be to hold the patent
invalid as inherently anticipated.303 In writing his second SmithKline decision Rader
once again corrected the original mistakes made in Judge Posner’s district court decision,
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but then went on to invalidate the ‘723 patent based on inherent anticipation.304 Rader
found the ‘196 patent was enabled and, if practiced, would inevitably result in at least
trace amounts of hemihydrate.305 Thus, he concluded that the record had shown by clear
and convincing evidence that the ‘196 patent inherently anticipated the ‘723 patent since,
under Schering, inherent anticipation did not require PHOSITA to “recognize the
inherent disclosure at the time the prior art is created.”306 Additionally, the Court
refused to save the patent by requiring that Apotex take extraordinary measures to
practice the prior art without infringing the ‘723 patent.307 In invalidating the ‘723
patent, Judge Rader reiterated his dicta from Schering that some protection could be
allowed for the ‘723 hemihydrate, but that SmithKline could not receive a patent over the
“bare compound.”308
SmithKline signals the Federal Circuit’s wholehearted acceptance of Judge
Rader’s position on inherent anticipation. The only exception was Judge Newman, who
once again dissented to the denial of a rehearing en banc. Judge Newman objected to the
Circuit’s decision to reverse the panel regarding public use during clinical trials, while
leaving the panel’s enlargement of inherent anticipation in place.309 Judge Newman saw
this as an even larger expansion of inherent anticipation because there was “no evidence
whatsoever that the hemihydrate existed at the time that the anhydrate application was
filed, and no evidence that such existence would have been recognized by a person of
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skill in the field of the invention.”310 Newman contended Continental Can was still good
law, and the question should still be whether a substance’s existence would have been
known by PHOSITA, not whether “it might have lain hidden in minuscule amount,
undetected, unsuspected, and unknown.”311 “[O]nly after a compound is identified does
it become subject to patenting; if its existence is not reasonably known to persons of skill
in the field, its later discovery cannot be retrospectively “inherently anticipated.”312
SmithKline makes sense from a public policy standpoint, but it also appears that
the Federal Circuit went further than necessary to protect the public. The new question is
whether the Court’s new doctrine on inherent anticipation is consistent with the goals of
patent law, or is it drawing a categorical limitation that refuses patents to discoveries that
significantly advance science? The Seaborg case suggested that something which is
inherently present, but unknowable, is still patentable if it meets all the other eligibility
requirements of patents. Judge Newman also made a reasonable suggestion that patents
be interpreted in a manner that does not prevent the practicing of the prior art. This issue
is especially relevant in the area of pharmaceuticals, where it is not always possible to
understand all the metabolites that may possess utility. The Hatch –Waxman Act
acknowledges that pharmaceuticals play a special role in our society. That special role
can lead to statutoryrevisions that recognize , not only the role of pharmaceuticals in our
society, but also the difficulty in claiming metabolites that can possess actual utility and
offer value to a patent holder.
III. Hatch-Waxman
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Congress attempted to address the concerns of both brand name pharmaceutical
companies and the public through the passage of the “Hatch-Waxman Act.”313 The goal
of the act was to provide sufficient protection to pharmaceutical companies to spur the
research and development of new drugs, while also allowing generic drug manufactures
to quickly bring their drugs to market.314
Pharmaceutical manufacturers were protected by the Hatch-Waxman Act by
becoming eligible for a patent term restoration.315 Patent extension under §156 is limited
to a single instance for the active ingredient of a new drug product, and the extension is
limited to “the time equal to the regulatory review period for the approved product.”316
The extension restoration period for the patent was capped at five years, and total patent
protection was not permitted to extend beyond fourteen years from the date that the FDA
approved the new drug application.317 Pharmaceutical manufacturers are entitled to list
any patents related to a drug in the “Orange Book”, and a generic drug manufacturer must
address the validity of each of those patents before FDA approval of an abbreviated new
drug application (ANDA) can be finalized.318 Should a pharmaceutical company sue a
generic manufacturer for technical infringement after their filing of an ANDA, a thirty
month stay is granted to the FDA approval process pending the outcome of litigation.319
Subsequent listings in the “Orange Book” can result in consecutive stays which often
313
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have the affect of delaying final approval to proposed generic drugs for periods much
longer than the originally intended thirty months.320 This unintended extension was
rendered virtually immune from judicial review by the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Mylan, which held that district courts have no statutory authority to shorten the thirty
month stay granted by an Orange Book listing, but did suggest administrative relief could
be sought under the Administrative Procedure Act.321 Additionally, the court
subsequently found in Mylan v. Thompson that no private right of action existed to secure
the delisting of a questionable patent from the “Orange Book.”322 Although antitrust
action exists, pharmaceuticals companies have proven adept at avoiding such liability.323
The provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act that were intended to protect brandname pharmaceutical companies were meant to spur further research and development by
allowing these companies to maximize their investments in various drugs, however, the
act was a tradeoff. The benefit that the brand-name pharmaceuticals received was that
the patent term of their drugs were tolled for the time required to receive regulatory
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approval, but their overall protection could not extend beyond fourteen years.324 This
extension could only be granted once and had to be filed prior to the expiration of the
original patent.325
In exchange the generic companies received an extended experimental use
privilege so that they could more quickly market generic versions of drugs.326 Prior to
Hatch-Waxman, pharmaceutical companies received a de facto extension on expired
patents because generic drug manufacturers were required to conduct their own testing
program to demonstrate safety and efficacy to the FDA for marketing approval.327
Hatch-Waxman allows generic drug manufacturers to rely on the clinical trial data
provided to the FDA by the original marketer of a drug in order to fulfill the FDA
regulatory requirements.328 These applications that rely on a third party’s proof of safety
and efficacy are known as ANDAs.329 ANDA applicants need only show that the drug
they seek to market is the bioequivalent of the originally approved drug.330 Also, generic
drug manufacturers are permitted to “make and use the patented product, even though the
patent hadn’t yet expired, in order to demonstrate bioequivalence.”331 To further
encourage the entry of generic drugs into the marketplace, the first generic manufacturer
to successfully apply for an ANDA receives a 180 day exclusive marketing period,
during which time this manufacturer and the original manufacturer would exist as
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“duopolists.”332 Through these steps the Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to expedite the
marketing of generic versions of brand name drugs.333 However, as previously discussed,
pharmaceuticals have still proved adept at using orange book patent listings to delay the
entry of generic drugs into the market.
The provisions of Hatch-Waxman demonstrate that Congress already recognizes
that pharmaceuticals possess unique qualities, within themselves and to the public, that
necessitate special treatment. The patent extension for time lost marketing a drug
because of lengthy regulatory approval processes is a great example of the extreme
lengths to which Congress will go to ensure continued research and development.
Additionally, Congress arguably permits pharmaceutical companies to abuse the “Orange
Book” listing regimen intended to prevent the FDA from approving the manufacture of a
generic drug still protected by a pa tent.
Due to the seeming willingness by Congress to take all reasonable steps to allow
pharmaceutical companies to maximize the value of drug patents, so as to encourage
future research and development, it is time for Congress to reevaluate the patent law, as
related to biological and pharmaceutical inventions, in light of Schering and SmithKline.
The primary problem with the Schering and SmithKline cases is that the Federal Circuit
in adopting a hard-line rule, which is sensible in light of public policy, has foreclosed
patents for metabolites that are unrecognized but that provide utility. T he Schering case
ultimately prevents any type of patent protection for the true scientific advancement of a
chemical composition. This view is not consistent with the goals of patent law because
patent law is intended to encourage and protect innovation. There is a significant danger
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that the new rule of inherent anticipation adopted by the Federal Circuit will make
research and development into metabolites impractical due to the danger that any patents
gained may be held invalid if any prior art is found have produced that metabolite,
regardless of whether the metabolite was previously known or in any way related to the
utility of the prior art. However, based upon the importance of pharmaceutical and
biological inventions in society a full term patent may not prove be the preferred solution.
Congress has determined, as demonstrated by the policy choices made by HatchWaxman, that pharmaceutical compositions need to be treated differently from other
patented materials due their importance to society though the benefits accorded to the
overall quality of living.334 Due to these considerations a statutory compromise is
necessary.
IV. Policy Suggestions
The cases of both Schering and SmithKline (Paxil) demonstrate instances where a
useful metabolite was discovered, but found to be anticipated because the discovery was
made after the original patent’s critical date.335 However, the Federal Circuit’s adoption
of a rigid prohibition on metabolites fails to address the complexities that go into the
discovery of a patentable biological or pharmaceutical invention. The law of anticipation
was meant to prevent extensions of patents that would, in turn, prohibit the public from
practicing an invention without advancing science in return. Absent a finding that a
patent applicant is attempting to extend their patent without further advancing science,
there is a need to examine patent applications for metabolites and other biological
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inventions on a case by case basis. Towards thisgoal I will make recommendations on
how to protect pharmaceutical companies’ discoveries of metabolites, while still
protecting the public by ensuring that the passing of these discoveries into the public
domain is not unduly delayed. A review of the practical implications of both the
Schering case and the SmithKline (Paxil) case helps to demonstrate the necessity for a
new statutory regimen for such patents.
In the case of Schering, an argument can be made that a finding of inherency is
appropriate because the discovered metabolite, DCL, may have provided some utility to
the patent, although it is not certain to what degree.336 DCL is a type of antihistamine
that does not cause drowsiness, and it was covered by the ‘716 patent which issued three
years after the ‘233 patent.337 The ‘233 patent covers the chemical makeup of Claritin,
Schering’s antihistamine that was attractive in the market because it did not cause
drowsiness.338 Upon the expiration of the ‘233 patent, generic manufactures wished to
manufacture generic versions of this patent, but they were required to assert the invalidity
of the ‘716 patent because of Schering’s “Orange Book” listing of that patent in
connection with the ‘233 patent.339 The practical implication of the “O
range Book”
listing was that Schering was attempting to prevent generic drug manufacturers from
practicing the ‘233 patent, even after it had entered the public domain.
The Federal Circuit was, quite understandably, troubled by this notion. However,
in attempting to rectify the situation the Circuit chose to use a sledgehammer against a
fly. The listing by Schering in the “Orange Book” of the ‘716 patent in connection with
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the ‘233 patent was quite questionable, but Schering’s other actions do not necessarily
lead to a conclusion of bad intent. Most notably, the ‘716 patent was applied for in 1984,
a mere three years after the ‘233 patent. If Schering’s intent was to extend the patent of
the ‘233 patent, they would have been much better served by delaying the application for
several more years. Secondly, the court never addressed whether the ‘716 patent
advanced science. If the ‘716 patent did advance science, then the notion that a patent
should be denied categorically is misplaced. This view receives support from Judge
Lourie’s dissent, which points out the difficulty of finding all metabolites prior to clinical
trials, which in themselves may take years to receive approval for.340
Furthermore, if discoveries such as DCL are denied patent protection it is likely
that companies, such as Schering, will choose in the future to maintain such unpatentable
advancements as trade secrets, lest a competitor be handed a starting point to reverse
engineer a competing product before the expiration of the original patent. If the practical
result of the Schering decision is to encourage recourse by pharmaceutical companies to
trade secret, then the policy goals of patent law have not been served because scientific
advancement will not become readily accessible to the public.341

Lastly, despite the

complications brought on by Mylan v. Thompson342 and Andrx v. Biovail,343 the simplest
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solution to problems such as these is to refuse to permit a pharmaceutical company to
block generic manufacturers’ production of drugs that have passed into the public
domain. This position, put forward by Judge Newman, is consistent with the current
statute that permits the FDA to approve an ANDA once successful litigation has been
concluded by generic drug manufacturers, so rapid summary dismissals of such claims
are the best solution to this complicated problem.344
The SmithKline Paxil case provides an example of the potential pitfalls of the
Schering rule. In this case SmithKline originally received a patent for paroxetine (the
‘196 patent), but later received a second patent for the hemihydrate form of paroxetine
(the ‘723 patent).345 The ‘723 patent was received after the ‘196 material “morphed” into
a more stable hemihydrate state, from the less stable anhydrous form of the drug.346 The
primary value of the hemihydrate form of the drug was not to the patient because the
record did not indicate that the hemihydrate form of the drug contributed to its utility.
Rather, the utility of the hemihydrate was that it was more easily manufactured in a stable
pseudo-polymorph form.
However, SmithKline’s position in litigation was that generic manufacturers
should not be permitted to practice even the ‘196 patent because it would invariably
contain ‘723 material, due to seeding, and that ingesting the ‘196 material would
inevitably lead to small amounts of the ‘723 material in metabolite form.347 The court
ultimately concluded that the inevitable creation of small amounts of ‘723 material within
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a patient’s stomach made that patent invalid as inherently anticipated.348 This position,
once again, is understandable given SmithKline’s unreasonable position in the litigation,
but it fails to grant SmithKline protection for the advancement that the ‘723 patent
recognized. The value of the ‘723 patent was not the metabolite formed in the patient’
stomach but, rather, the value was in the efficiency of manufacture as compared to the
‘196 material.
Through its ruling in the SmithKline case the Federal Circuit has created a
troubling situation that presents a substantial danger to innovation. Consider the
following hypothetical: Company A discovers a metabolite that proves extremely
valuable at treating a common condition. This metabolite is patentable under 35 U.S.C.
§§101-103, and Company A is granted a patent. After the FDA has approved Company
A’s New Drug Application (NDA) the drug is marketed and becomes extremely popular.
Generic Company B then files an ANDA asserting that the patent for the metabolite is
invalid. Company B’s basis for their claim of invalidity is that prior art Z has been found
to have produced the patented metabolite as a byproduct. The metabolite in question in
no way contributed to the utility of prior art Z and was undetected in the prior art until
Company B recently began scouring all prior art for a way to invalidate Company’s A
patent on the new blockbuster metabolite. Under the Federal Circuit’s inherent
anticipation rule in Schering and SmithKline the new patent on the metabolite should be
invalidated. The practical result of this rule is that Company A will not invest in the
research and development of metabolites because they will not be able to patent such
discoveries, making it highly unlikely that they can recoup their investment. Instead, a
windfall will be had by the generic companies who will be permitted to piggyback on the
348

Id.

64

work of brand-name pharmaceuticals to a degree not anticipated or intended by HatchWaxman.

In this way the ruling in SmithKline undercuts the purposes of patent law and

encourages recourse to trade secret, if pharmaceuticals choose to invest in metabolite
research at all.
There currently exists a need to balance the public’s right to have access to
generic drugs, while still ensuring that pharmaceuticals receive an adequate return on
their investment so that they will continue research and development. My first suggestion
is simple: alter the law to prevent consecutive listings in the Orange Book, while also
granting district courts the power to order delisting. Hopefully, courts will also begin to
dismiss as meritless cases that attempt to prevent parties from practicing inventions that
have fallen into the public domain, even if their use leads to the production of a patented
product.
Secondly, I suggest a middle ground for the patenting of metabolites by creating a
limited exception to the double-patenting rule. First it should be asked whether a
metabolite would be patentable but for inherent anticipation. Then it should be
determined whether the party acted promptly to patent the metabolite upon its discovery.
This would prevent the gamesmanship that both Judges Newman and Rader are
concerned about by holding a party accountable if they had knowledge superior to that of
PHOSITA. If the company acted diligently, it should then be asked whether PHOSITA
would have recognized the trait prior to the critical date of the original patent. If
PHOSITA would have recognized the trait prior to the critical date of the original patent
then the appropriate step would have been for the applicant to receive a patent with a
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terminal disclaimer; and further protection should be refused because to allow otherwise
would merely extend a patent without reciprocal benefit to the public.
If PHOSITA would not have recognized the discovery, then additional protection
is appropriate if science is sufficiently advanced. I suggest that a patent be granted that
will run for the length of the original patent, plus an additional five years after the
termination of the protected term under Hatch-Waxman, and applicants for this patent
would not be limited to the original patent owner. This would encourage research and
development by others of patented material and any discovery would likely benefit the
public. However, this patent would be limited in scope so as not to render anyone who is
unknowingly practicing the metabolite, or practicing the prior art, an infringer; and only
one five year extension could be obtained, but this extension could run consecutive to an
extension under Hatch-Waxman if the patents are owned by the same party. The patent
could be used to prevent future competitors from entering the market if they had not
already developed their composition at the time the extension patent was filed. Such an
extended patent also need not affect the ability of pharmaceutical companies to receive
the patents Judge Rader spoke of in Schering over pure forms, pharmaceutical
compositions, or for a method of administering, since this a limited exception to the
double patenting rule, and obviousness should be judged from the original patent, not the
limited five year patent.
Congress needs to address the fact that the discovery of metabolites is not
analogous to the situation in General Electric, where a party attempted to receive an
additional patent on an invention that had already passed to the public domain.349 The
discovery of a metabolite constitutes a substantial discovery that advances science and
349
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holds the potential of leading to the development of alternative medications that bring
about the preferred metabolites. The new rules suggested would allow pharmaceutical
companies who discover useful metabolites to more fully exploit their discovery so that
the resources will exist for further research and development. The benefit to the public
would be that the metabolite that causes a desirable result would become generally
known so that other companies could begin their own research and development to
determine other ways to practice the patented metabolite; as well as allowing generic
companies to practice the protected metabolite after a delay of five years, as opposed to
the twenty years that they would normally endure were a full patent given to such a
discovery.
V. Conclusion
The problems associated with the patenting of metabolites are fairly new because
the technology and incentive to develop such inventions only appeared within the past
several decades. As science comes to better understand the function of the human body
and its reactions to foreign agents such as pharmaceuticals, the time has come to create a
sound policy that directly addresses the patenting of metabolites. This policy needs to
balance both the interest of the public to receive generic versions of pharmaceuticals, as
well as the needs of pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue producing the new drugs
that will improve the general standard of public health. I believe that a minor extension
to an existing patent, to cover recently discovered metabolites, makes sense and will
serve both these goals by creating only a minor delay in receiving generic drugs, but
improving pharmaceutical companies’ ability to fully exploit a discovery. I believe that
while this view will not allow either side claim to victory, it will address the major
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underlying concerns addressed by both Judge Newman and Judge Rader that new
discoveries be protected and that public policy be secured.
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